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Introduction 
Anthony Flood, a contributor to the libertarian internet publication 
LewRockwell.com, wrote concerning the nineteenth-century intellectual, Lord Acton, 
“…Acton was a libertarian hero. His championing of liberty against power was the 
central theme of his intellectual life… Needlessly impoverished are those libertarians 
who fail to embrace him as one of their own.”1  Libertarians, including Flood, love to 
draw nineteenth-century classical liberals into the present and act as if these past figures 
are mirror images of themselves.  They also enjoy vindicating less favorably looked upon 
nineteenth-century classical liberals.  A favorite selection for this enterprise is Herbert 
Spencer, who is often associated with social Darwinism and of whom Roderick T. Long, 
another contributor to LewRockwell.com, wrote, “It has long been open season on 
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). Perhaps because he was the 19th century's most prominent 
defender of individual liberty and critic of the violence of the state, Spencer has always 
been the object of hatred and distortion; indeed, it sometimes seems that no accusation is 
too bizarre to be leveled against him.”2  Acton, Spencer, and other historical figures may 
consider themselves lucky to have libertarians, like Flood and Long, who are eager to 
brush off the dust of the past or to scrub away the tarnish of an unpalatable reputation in 
order to claim these figures as their own. 
                                                 
1 Anthony Flood, “Lord Acton: Libertarian Hero,” LewRockwell.com, 4 April 2006, 
<http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/flood2.html> (9 October 2007). 
 
2 Roderick T. Long, “Herbert Spencer: The Defamation Continues,” LewRockwell.com, 28 August 2003, 
<http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig3/long3.html> (9 October 2007). 
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Libertarianism is a philosophy characterized by strict adherence to the principles 
of individual liberty and free market economics.  There is overlap between the ideas and 
terminology employed by libertarians and classical liberals.  Yet the two groups cannot 
be equated because libertarians and classical liberals stand in separate historical contexts 
and have faced different problems.  Libertarian attempts to revive classical liberalism and 
to draw continuities between classical liberals and themselves reveal how concepts and 
terms change over time; acknowledging their historical nature holds implications for 
contemporary discourse.  Placing Acton and Spencer in their historical contexts helps 
highlight the origin and development of classical liberal concepts while also revealing 
why some libertarians want to claim this tradition, in an ahistorical form, as their own.  
 John Emerich Edward Dahlberg-Acton (1834-1902) was, on the surface, a man of 
contradictions.  He was a liberal Catholic member of the British aristocracy, an historian 
with a moral mission, and a political thinker with a self-avowed love of liberty.  Most of 
Acton’s published material appeared as articles in the Rambler, the Home and Foreign 
Review, the Chronicle, and the North British Review, and was focused on liberal 
Catholicism, historical studies, and political analysis of contemporary and past events.  
Acton intended to produce a complete history of liberty stemming from his lectures as 
Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge entitled “The History of Freedom in 
Antiquity” and “The History of Freedom in Christianity,” but this project remained 
unfinished at the time of his death.  As a liberal Catholic, Acton believed it was the 
Catholic Church’s duty to promote individual liberty, self government, and scientific 
research.  These principles, while not directly and explicitly furthering Catholic interests, 
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Acton believed would ultimately protect justice, the Church, and the Catholic faith.3  The 
theme of liberty served as the common thread uniting Acton’s broad range of work.   
 Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was a British thinker whose interests spanned 
political philosophy, psychology, biology, and sociology.  His politically-oriented 
writings include The Proper Sphere of Government (1848), Social Statistics (1851), and 
The Man versus the State (1884).  Prominent themes within these writings are 
government noninterference and individual freedom of action limited by the rights of 
others.  Spencer also attempted to gather all known branches of knowledge, or the 
sciences, under a set of universal natural laws in his Synthetic Philosophy, a multivolume 
work under the headings of First Principles (1862), Principles of Biology (1864-1867), 
Principles of Psychology (1870-1872), Principles of Sociology (1876-1897), and 
Principles of Ethics (1879-1893).  Despite the variety of Spencer’s interests and works, 
he is often most readily associated with the development of sociology and social 
Darwinism. 
Considering the centrality of liberty within the thought of Acton and Spencer, 
these men are easily labeled liberal figures, yet liberal and liberalism are complex terms 
not so easily defined.  The conceptual umbrella of liberalism is quite broad, and a glance 
at the table of contents of any set of books claiming to cover liberalism illustrates this 
                                                 
3 J. Rufus Fears, biographical note and forward to Selected Writings of Lord Acton Volume 1: Essays in the 
History of Liberty by John Emerich Edward Dahlberg-Acton (Indianapolis, Indiana: LibertyClassics, 
1984), ix-xii. 
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point.4  Definitions of liberalism usually present the concept of individual freedom and 
liberty as one of the core values.  Other concepts frequently marshaled to flesh out 
liberalism further are: equal rights, constitutional government, rule of law, toleration, 
hostility to arbitrary government, challenge and limitation of power, and valuation of 
reason, contract, and the present over tradition, status, and the past.5  Because liberalism 
emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and given its dominance in the 
nineteenth century, definitions of liberalism often include discussions of elements, such 
as industrialization and the rise of the middle class, that pertain to the social and 
economic context of Europe in those time periods.6  Some of the most frequently cited 
liberal thinkers are John Locke (1632-1704), Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Adam Smith (1723-1790), Benjamin Constant (1767-
1830), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1805-1859).7   
                                                 
4 F. Rosen, Bentham, Byron, and Greece: Constitutionalism, Nationalism, and Early Liberal Political 
Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 289.  Rosen discussed the problem of defining liberalism and its 
canon.  In footnote four Rosen listed the individuals covered in two books to highlight the problem. 
   
5 Ian Adams, Political Ideology Today (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 10 and E. K. 
Bramsted and K. J. Melhuish, eds., Western Liberalism: A History in Documents from Locke to Croce 
(London: Longman, 1978), xvii. 
 
6 Bramsted and Melhuish, xvii. 
 
7 Andrew Vincent, “Classical Liberalism and Its Crisis of Identity,” History of Political Thought 11 (Spring 
1990): 146-147. 
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Part of the difficulty in settling on a definition of liberalism and a liberal canon is 
that liberalism spans a wide geographic area: continental Europe, Britain, and North 
America.  While these areas can be said to hold liberalism in common, each imparts its 
own flair to the philosophy.  For example, liberalism in continental Europe was 
preoccupied with anti-clericalism, a fierce opposition and sometimes even intolerance for 
the Catholic Church, while the British were more concerned with nonconformity, or 
skepticism, toleration, and Protestant dissent.8  One of the more significant, influential, 
and developed subsets of liberalism, and the broader intellectual and political context of 
Lord Acton and Herbert Spencer, is the British liberal tradition. 
The history of British liberalism is often depicted as a progression from classical 
liberalism to new liberalism.  Classical liberals conceived of society as a collection of 
individuals and granted a limited role to the state.  This limitation was closely associated 
with the concept of negative freedom and rights, or noninterference with the individual.  
Departing from this individualistic conception of society, new liberals depicted society as 
an organic whole with individuals as distinct parts working together.  New liberals 
expanded the role of the state to judging the needs of individuals and society.  This 
expanded role was closely associated with the concept of positive freedom and rights.  
Positive freedom and rights presupposes that in order to have a worthwhile and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 Bramsted and Melhuish, xviii-xix. 
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meaningful existence the individual requires certain pre-determined goods and it is the 
state’s role to provide these goods.9 
Clear cut divisions between the two varieties of liberalism – a classical liberalism 
more prevalent in the early half of the nineteenth century and a new liberalism more 
prevalent towards the end of the nineteenth century – can easily be made.  Yet the 
historical nature of this shift, as well as the question of whether there was a shift, are 
points of contention within scholarship on the British liberal tradition.  This debate is 
shaped, in part, by figures, such as, George L. Bernstein, Michael Freeden, Robert 
Eccleshall, and Andrew Vincent.  The shift is alternately viewed as a socialist betrayal of 
classical liberalism or a dramatic change from an individualistic to a socialistic core, as 
representing the fluidity of liberal concepts or illustrating a dialectic within liberalism; 
others deny that there was a shift. 
The historiography of liberalism and the debate over the trajectory of British 
liberalism highlight several methodological issues within intellectual history.  Crane 
Brinton (1898-1968), an intellectual historian, described three approaches that 
characterize early intellectual historiography on political thought: the “method of ideas,” 
the “method of men,” and the method of political opinion.  The historian employing the 
“method of ideas” presents his material around a set of ideas or problems he deems to be 
important while the historian employing the “method of men” organizes his material 
                                                 
9 Richard Hudelson, Modern Political Philosophy (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 1999), 89-90 
and Simon Potter, “How New Was the New Liberalism?” Modern History Review 11, no. 3 (February 
2000): 20. 
 
 7
around those thinkers he considers worthy of attention.10  Histories of political opinion 
attempt to establish the connection between political thought and action by examining the 
thoughts of everyday individuals.11  The “method of ideas” and “the method of men,” by 
their segmented nature, close off the possibility of fully examining change over time.  
While histories of political opinion seem more open to viewing change over time, this 
method, like that of “ideas” and “men,” ignores the debate over the shift from classical to 
new liberalism in the British tradition by limiting its scope to exploring causal relations 
between ideas and events. 
The “method of men” and “method of ideas” are ways of generating two kinds of 
histories of philosophy highlighted by the philosopher Richard Rorty (1931-2007): 
Geistesgeschichte and doxography.  Geistesgeschichte is the label Rorty gave to the 
practices of historians who engage in canon formation and legitimization, or the process 
of determining which works and individuals are important and which questions are worth 
asking.  Rorty described doxography as the approach in which an historian attempts an 
all-encompassing history of philosophy and thus must force all of his selected material to 
weigh in on particular questions.  This becomes problematic when, given the tremendous 
time span of the material, each thinker examined may not have addressed the problems in 
                                                 
10 Two examples of the “method of men” approach in nineteenth-century British political thought are Crane 
Brinton’s English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1949) and Wilfrid Harrison’s Conflict and 
Compromise: History of British Political Thought 1593-1900 (1965). 
 
11 Crane Brinton, English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
1-4. 
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question nor may those problems have been of consideration in each thinker’s time 
period.12 
These methods can force an historian to take a conceptual, or static, view of a 
subject, such as liberalism, that generates a result that is more like a philosopher or 
political theorist’s work.  An historian would ideally take an historical view of a subject 
that acknowledges and examines change.  A conceptual analysis, which is a value-
definition approach, produces an ahistorical eclecticism that fails to set any time limits on 
a subject.  This approach produces those histories of liberalism that span from Ancient 
Greece into the present.13  While Ancient Greece exhibits the principle of direct 
democracy it is erroneous to label it as liberal.  It is more accurate to say that ideas and 
examples preserved from Ancient Greece could have provided an inspiration to those 
later thinkers in seventeenth-century Europe onwards who developed liberalism.  This is 
a distinction libertarians also gloss over as evidenced by works, such as David Boaz’s 
The Libertarian Reader: Classic and Contemporary Readings from Lao-Tzu to Milton 
Friedman. 
                                                 
12 Richard Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres” in Philosophy in History: Essays on 
the Historiography of Philosophy, eds. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 58, 61-62. 
 
13 Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (New York: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 
1984), 11-12.  Arblaster cites J. Salwyn Schapiro’s Liberalism: Its Meaning and History (1958) as an 
example.   
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This blurring between the lines of history and philosophy is also reflected in 
another approach, rational reconstruction, discussed by Rorty.  Through rational 
reconstruction the historian attempts to bring the philosopher’s work into the present.  
Those engaging in rational reconstruction are essentially imposing their own language, or 
terminology, on the past in order to make long-dead philosophers into conversational 
partners in the hopes of answering the questions and problems that preoccupy the 
present.14  This approach tends to be closer to the work of the philosopher than the 
historian.  It is also similar to what libertarians are presently doing when they deal with 
classical liberals. 
Exercises in rational reconstruction tend to characterize the shift from classical 
liberalism to new liberalism in two ways.  Some authors view the shift as a betrayal.  
These individuals uphold classical liberalism as the true liberalism and view the new 
liberalism as a quasi-socialist imposter.  Others see liberalism as undergoing a significant 
change from an individualistic to a socialistic character.15  Both of these interpretations 
are popular among libertarians.  The latter appears to incorporate a more historical view 
suggesting change over time, but it is still more idea-oriented than contextual. 
                                                 
14 Rorty, 49. 
 
15 Andrew Vincent, “Divided Liberalisms?” History of Political Thought 9 (Spring 1988): 164.  Vincent is 
reviewing Michael Freeden’s Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought 1914-1939 (1986) 
as well as George L. Bernstein’s Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England (1986) and Robert 
Eccleshall’s British Liberalism: Liberal Thought from the 1640s to 1980s (1986). 
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A component of historical reconstruction, the fourth approach discussed by Rorty, 
and one of the most influential developments in the intellectual historiography of political 
thought was the linguistic turn of the 1980s fueled largely by the work of J. G. A. Pocock 
and Quentin Skinner.16  Discourse, as defined by Pocock, is a series of speech acts 
performed by an agent within a context determined by social structures and historical 
situations.  These speech acts both perform on and modify the agent’s audience and the 
agent himself as well as language, historical, political, and social situational structures.  
For example, within political thought political languages exist that serve as structures.  A 
speaker selects a language and enjoins it on the hearer.  The hearer then modifies the 
language that the speaker enjoined on him to suit his own purposes.  From this groups of 
speakers and hearers come to debate languages, or structures.  Out of these debates 
emerges a politics of language as well as languages of politics.  This is the environment 
the intellectual historian wades into.17  Pocock thus viewed the history of political 
thought not as the study of canonical texts but as an investigation into the changing 
political languages societies used.18   
                                                 
16 An example of the linguistic turn in the historiography of British political thought is J. W. Burrow’s 
Whigs and Liberals: Continuity and Change in English Political Thought (1988).  Burrow, noting the 
recent historical work pertaining to political discourses in the eighteenth century, attempted to trace those 
discourses into the nineteenth century and how they changed (ix). 
 
17 J. G. A. Pocock, “Reconstruction of Discourse: Towards the Historiography of Political Thought,” MLN 
96, no. 5 (1981): 959, 966. 
 
18 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 104-105. 
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 Similarly, Quentin Skinner, in light of Pocock’s work, described the activity of 
interpreting a text as twofold.  First, the historian should attempt to recapture the 
substance of an argument.  Secondly, the historian should seek to understand what the 
author of a text may have meant by writing in the manner that he did.  This involves 
examining the author’s speech acts – his conclusions, what he supported, what he 
attacked, what he ridiculed, what he scorned, what he was silent about, and so on.19 
 More recent historians have criticized the linguistic turn for overemphasizing 
discourse at the expense of historical experience.  Mark Francis and John Morrow in A 
History of English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1994), for example, 
provided a more up-to-date survey of the field in light of the historiographical 
developments brought about by the linguistic turn.20  While noting work on eighteenth-
century discourses, Francis and Morrow asserted: 
When conjuring up an image of nineteenth-century political thought, the most 
appropriate one which comes to mind is that of a stage upon which stand a large 
number of figures and a few groups.  While these figures and groups all address 
the audience or parts of it, they rarely speak to one another, and when they do so, 
they are not speaking from the same script, nor even from one of a few possible 
scripts.21 
                                                 
19 Quentin Skinner, “The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives” in 
Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, eds. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, 
and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 201. 
 
20 Mark Francis and John Morrow, A History of English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), vii. 
 
21 Francis and Morrow, 3-4. 
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Francis and Morrow claimed that nineteenth-century thinkers did not use the political 
languages of the past nor should they be tied to the early modern period.22  Francis and 
Marrow advocated a broader application of historical reconstruction.  Historical 
reconstruction, which also includes discourse work, limits the historian’s interpretative 
activity to placing a figure and his works into his context.  Contrasted with rational 
reconstruction, the historian engaging in historical reconstruction is not making a 
conversational partner, but is making the past more intelligible to the present.   
Historical reconstruction, unlike the “method of men,” the “method of ideas,” 
Geistesgeschichte, doxography, and rational reconstruction, more readily acknowledges 
change over time and thus allows for more nuanced characterizations of the shift from 
classical liberalism to new liberalism, as well as for a critique of the shift idea itself.  The 
attention to terminology and concepts within their respective contexts that historical 
reconstruction encourages makes room for views such as that of George L. Bernstein, 
who defined liberalism as a broad-based doctrine that can incorporate both the elements 
of classical liberalism and new liberalism.  In this view, the Gladstone administrations of 
the late nineteenth century serve as an umbrella for the juxtaposition of liberal groups 
including classical economists, non-conformists, radicals, Whigs, Liberal Unionists, and 
Chamberlainite interventionists.  Another view is that of Michael Freeden and Robert 
Eccleshall, who suggested the presence of a dialectic throughout the history of liberal 
thought.  They posited that liberalism has certain core themes that were given shape in 
different contexts and times and even utilized in other political movements.  For example, 
                                                 
22 Francis and Morrow, 4. 
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the Liberty and Property Defence League, a group largely inspired by Herbert Spencer 
and that drew on classical liberal ideas, was composed of liberals and conservatives in 
late-nineteenth-century Britain.23       
Andrew Vincent challenged the very idea of a shift between classical and new 
liberalism.  He took particular issue with Freeden and Eccleshall’s theory, asserting that it 
does not reflect what nineteenth-century thinkers perceived.  Vincent cited the 
nineteenth-century thinkers A. V. Dicey (1835-1922), Herbert Spencer, and Henry 
Sidgwick (1838-1900), who perceived a crisis in liberal thought and wrote concerning the 
socialist and collectivist trend challenging classical liberalism.  Rather than a shift from 
classical liberalism to new liberalism, Vincent suggested that the concepts that define 
classical liberalism were too flexible to be the foundation of a liberal orthodoxy.  
Classical liberals themselves even differed in their interpretations and applications of 
these concepts.  This difference of opinion allowed for a variety of measures to be 
advocated that made classical liberals increasingly uncomfortable.  Thus the measures 
enacted by liberal administrations in Great Britain from the1880s to 1914 could be 
criticized and defended by liberals given the flexibility of liberal criteria.  The tenets of 
liberalism did not change, but were applied differently.24 
 Lord Acton and Herbert Spencer are among a second generation of liberal 
thinkers writing in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  Most historians writing about 
the shift from classical to new liberalism have largely ignored them with the exception of 
                                                 
23 “Classical Liberalism and Its Crisis of Identity,” 144 and “Divided Liberalisms?,” 164-165. 
 
24 “Classical Liberalism and Its Crisis of Identity,” 145-146.   
 
 14
references to Spencer as an example of classical liberalism’s betrayal by the quasi-
socialist new liberalism.  This could be because the scholarship on Acton and Spencer is 
centered on questions concerning a figure’s relevance to the present and his legacy rather 
than the nature of liberalism and its development. 
Scholars studying Acton stressed his relevance to the present.  Gertrude 
Himmelfarb in Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics (1952) went so far as to 
assert that Acton’s Victorian England is “a civilization lost beyond recovery,” but that 
Acton is “of this age, more than of his” – he is “one of our contemporaries.”25  Roland 
Hill in Lord Acton (2000) described how Acton was deemed valuable in the early half of 
the twentieth century because of his maxim: “absolute power corrupts absolutely.” 
According to Hill, Acton’s relevance continues today through his ideas on the nature and 
development of freedom.26  Acton scholars explicitly encouraged the idea of continuity 
between classical liberalism and libertarianism by drawing direct lines between Acton 
and the present.  These works expressed a sense that Acton “got it right” and that the 
world would be a better place if only the world had listened to his admonitions 
concerning power and liberty.  This indirectly supports the view that the shift from 
classical to new liberalism was a betrayal or that the character of liberalism became more 
collectivistic rather than individualistic. 
                                                 
25 Gertrude Himmelfarb, Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics (Chicago, Illinois: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1952), vii. 
 
26 Roland, Lord Acton (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2000), xi, xix. 
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Scholarship on Spencer is centered on the question of what dominated Spencer’s 
thought: evolution or individualism.  Instead of viewing Spencer as an evolutionist whose 
political theory was a by-product of his scientific beliefs, David Wiltshire in The Social 
and Political Thought of Herbert Spencer (1978), presented Spencer as primarily a liberal 
individualist who provided an evolutionary basis for his political theory.  Wiltshire 
concluded that the evolutionary justification Spencer provided for his individualism 
actually produces results that render individualism in society impossible.27  Mark Francis 
in Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life (2000) criticized misrepresentations 
of Spencer as a Darwinian evolutionist since Spencer detested Darwin’s work.  Francis 
also criticized historians for incorrectly labeling Spencer as an individualist.  According 
to Francis, Spencer’s political beliefs were based on empirical data rather than the 
linguistic and conceptual tradition, identified by modern historians and applied to 
Victorian Britain, of the individual versus the state.28  These analyses suggest that 
Spencer’s experience either bolsters Vincent’s view of the fluidity of liberal concepts or 
that Spencer does not belong in evaluations of the development of liberalism.    
In this work I present an historical reconstructionist study of Lord Acton and 
Herbert Spencer within the overarching framework of the expanding circle of political 
power and participation in nineteenth-century Britain.  I argue that the works and 
                                                 
27 David Wiltshire, The Social and Political Thought of Herbert Spencer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978), 1-2. 
 
28 Mark Francis, Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2007), 2-3, 13-14. 
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contexts of Acton and Spencer reveal that there was a shift from classical liberalism to 
new liberalism within British political thought.  Contextual developments of the 
nineteenth century, such as the development and spread of evolutionary ideas and 
language as well as the emergence of an historical consciousness, undermined the 
conceptual framework underpinning the core values, individual liberty and individual 
rights, of classical liberalism.  These contextual developments helped to replace the 
classical liberal conceptual framework of the early nineteenth century that visualized 
society as a composite of individuals – individuals possessing reason, characterized by a 
static nature, and operating within a context of natural, universal law – with a conceptual 
framework more particular to the mid-to-late nineteenth century.  This later framework 
organicized society so that society itself became an entity.  Within this conceptualization, 
societies as well as the individuals within them are viewed as outgrowths of the past.  
Societies and individuals do not operate within a context of natural, universal law, but in 
a context in which societies and individuals are the dynamic, ever-changing 
accumulations of past inheritances.   
Acton and Spencer operated within this later underlying conceptual framework.  
Though on the surface they may appear to fit in with classical liberalism, Acton and 
Spencer illustrate this newer framework, which holds the possibility of yielding results 
that are new liberal rather than classical liberal.  This new underlying framework calls 
into question whether or not Acton and Spencer can be labeled classical liberals and 
sheds light on efforts of libertarians to claim classical liberalism as their own.  Acton and 
Spencer can be more accurately conceived of as classical liberal stunt men; figures who 
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resemble classical liberals enough to stand in for them just as the stunt man does for the 
action star but remain figures of an entirely different type.  
 18
I. Classical Liberalism and Its Context 
 
 A recurring theme within British politics from the seventeenth through the 
nineteenth century is the struggle over the widening ring of political power and 
participation.  Initially the monarchy commanded a monopoly over political power, 
which the aristocracy successfully challenged in the revolutions of the late seventeenth 
century.  As Britain began to industrialize, a middle class emerged that quickly began to 
increase in size and wealth.  This prosperous middle class also demanded a voice in the 
governance of Britain, which it gained with the expansion of the franchise in the Great 
Reform Bill of 1832.  The emergence of the working class, another consequence of 
industrialization, brought additional pressure to widen the circle of political power and 
participation to include the working masses, which was achieved through the Reform 
Bills of 1867 and 1884.  This theme of a struggle over a widening circle of political 
power and participation can serve as an overarching framework in which to situate Acton, 
Spencer, and the changing nature of liberalism.  The initial reference point of the thesis is 
classical liberalism.  This chapter serves to define classical liberalism, establish its 
context, and identify some of its most influential figures. 
 Classical liberalism is a broad, much-contested subject.  I cannot provide here a 
comprehensive treatment of classical liberalism.  Instead I will provide a limited 
definition of classical liberalism that highlights facets of the philosophy, such as 
individual liberty and individual rights, which are pertinent to this case study – pertinent 
in that they are articulated by classical liberal thinkers as well as Acton and Spencer.  It 
will also be a definition that simultaneously illustrates the multitudinous, and sometimes 
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contradictory, influences feeding into the philosophy, as well the role the philosophy 
plays in the overarching struggle over political power and participation in British society.   
 Classical liberalism is not the systematic philosophy of one or many thinkers.  
The concept and term itself is more of an after-the-fact construct.  The idea of an older 
liberalism threatened by a new liberalism emerged in the midst of the late-nineteenth-
century struggle over the meaning and nature of liberalism in Britain.1  Classical 
liberalism thus evolved into a term of use to historians and political theorists in order to 
identify a cluster of concepts that came into their own in the early half of the nineteenth 
century.  Classical liberalism is a confluence of several loosely-related threads within 
British political thought, such as the natural rights tradition, classical economics, 
utilitarianism, aesthetic individualism, and constitutionalism.2   
At its core classical liberalism is concerned with individual liberty and individual 
rights.    Classical liberals subscribed to a belief in man’s fundamental rationality and 
reasonableness and were committed to expanding individual rights and liberty.3  
Individual rights and liberty, as conceived by classical liberals, were negative in nature 
and translated into the individual’s right to be free from outside interference.4  Classical 
                                                 
1 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), 283-284. 
 
2 Bramsted and Melhuish, 4-34. 
 
3 Bramsted and Melhuish, 35-36 and Hudelson, 37. 
 
4 Hudelson, 89-90. 
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liberals held that everyone possessed an equal right to liberty though “everyone” at this 
point in time rarely meant more than every man or every man who met certain pre-
determined criteria.5 
 Stemming from this core of individualism and liberty are several peripheral 
concepts concerning the duties of governments and the expectations of their citizens.  
Classical liberals believed that the proper role of government was to safeguard the rights 
and liberties of its citizens, and this applied to minorities as well as majorities within 
society.  The optimal method for ensuring that a government fulfilled its duty, according 
to classical liberals, was to establish a rational political order based on a constitutional 
government of limited powers.  The individual rights applicable to government protection 
included a right to property, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of the 
press, and freedom of speech, expression, and opinion.6  Since these rights were both 
individual and equal classical liberals sought political and legal equality for all men – a 
theme that reverberated throughout the struggle to widen political power and 
participation.  Aside from this obligation governments were expected to operate under the 
principle of noninterference.  Classical liberals also applied this domestic policy to 
questions of foreign policy and advocated international harmony through nonintervention 
and free trade.7   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 “Classical Liberalism and Its Crisis of Identity,” 147. 
 
6 Bramsted and Melhuish, 36 and Hudelson, 37. 
 
7 Bramsted and Melhuish, 278 and Arblaster, 289. 
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In addition to a commitment to individual liberty and individual rights, classical 
liberals tended to be optimistic in regards to human capabilities.  They were advocates of 
self reliance and voluntarism, the idea that only voluntary acts could be deemed 
virtuous.8  Classical liberals were also strong believers in the idea of progress and the 
advancement of civilization as fueled by scientific development and middle class self-
confidence.9  Thus for classical liberals the impetus for improvement was solely in the 
hands of the individual.  Through knowledge, self control, discipline, and virtue the 
individual could work to improve his condition and his surroundings.     
 Because classical liberalism is the result of several overlapping threads in British 
political thought, those individuals who fall under the classical liberal label did not 
necessarily advocate all of the aforementioned principles nor act in line with them.  In 
fact, two contradictory philosophical traditions were used to derive and defend classical 
liberalism’s core principles of individual rights and liberty: natural law or natural rights 
theory and utilitarianism.  The natural law tradition roots freedom and individual rights in 
nature and as pre-existent to man-made institutions.  The utilitarian tradition roots 
freedom and individual rights in their usefulness as tools to maximize happiness.  Two of 
the most well-known representatives of each tradition are John Locke (1632-1704), a 
natural rights theorist, and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), a utilitarian. 
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 John Locke, as a participant in the struggle for power between Parliament and the 
monarchy in the seventeenth century, captures the early development of classical 
liberalism alongside the initial confrontation over political power and participation.  The 
general direction of seventeenth-century British liberal thought was toward establishing a 
connection between freedom and property and prosperity, as well as the founding of 
rights and political power on the basis of private property.  Locke’s patron was the Earl 
of Shaftesbury, one of the leaders in opposition to Charles II.  His Two Treatises of 
Government were written during the Exclusion Crisis (1678-1681), but were not 
published until 1690.  With this later publication date the two treatises were initially 
billed as a justification for the Whig settlement of 1688-89.  This was Parliament’s 
triumph over the monarchy, otherwise known as The Glorious Revolution in which 
William of Orange was invited to assume the English crown.  The Glorious Revolution 
was accompanied by the Bill of Rights, which rejected absolutism by limiting monarchal 
powers and transforming England into a constitutional monarchy led by a Parliament 
comprised of the landed aristocracy.10   
 Locke’s best-known work is the Second Treatise of Government in which he 
outlines the origins and purpose of government.  Locke described the state of nature as a 
condition in which each individual is governed by the law of nature.  By the law of nature 
the individual “is bound to preserve himself…[and]…when his own preservation comes 
                                                 
10 Arblaster, 152-153, 163, 167 and Paul Langford, “The Eighteenth Century (1688-1789)” in The Oxford 
History of Britain, ed. Kenneth O. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 399-402. 
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not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind.”11  In 
this state each individual is free to execute this law as he sees fit and equal in his power 
and authority to do so since no overarching judge exists yet between individuals.12  
Locke asserted that individuals desire “the preservation of their property,” property 
defined as “their lives, liberties and estates.”
being 
                                                
13  This desire cannot be filled satisfactorily 
in the state of nature, so men are inspired to leave it by coming together to place 
themselves under a common power for the security of their property.14  The formation of 
a government requires men to give up their individual power to execute the law of nature, 
both in regards to self preservation and the punishment of the transgressors of the law, to 
the public.15  The public then erects, for the good of society and the preservation of 
property, a common law and judicature to decide controversies and punish offenders of 
 
11 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1980), 9 (S6).  In citations from this source the information in parentheses 
following the page reference denotes the section number being cited.  For example, (S6) denotes section 
six. 
 
12 Locke, 8-10, 15 (S4, S7, S19). 
 
13 Locke, 65-66 (S123-124). 
 
14 Locke, 66 (S124). 
 
15 Locke, 47, 67-68 (S88, S128-130). 
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the law.16  In this manner Locke argues from a natural law perspective for the 
preservation of an individual’s life, liberty, and possessions as the reason for and duty of 
government.   
Before government may protect an individual’s possessions he must first have 
ownership of them, and to this end Locke also articulated a theory of property in the 
Second Treatise of Government.  According to Locke, while the Earth and all that is in it, 
excluding man, is owned by men in common, an individual first “has a property in his 
own person” and by extension his labor or work.17  An individual makes an item held in 
common his own by mixing his labor with it.  He may do so up to the point that there is 
“enough, and as good, left in common for others” and to the point of spoilage.18  Only 
through money, which is a representation of society’s consent, may an individual 
appropriate more than he himself is able to consume.19  In addition to providing a natural 
law defense for individual rights and limited government, Locke outlined a defense of 
property as well.  
 While Locke’s time period was characterized by the conflict between monarchy 
and Parliament, the development of the utilitarian tradition in the late eighteenth and 
                                                 
16 Locke, 46-48, 89 (S87, S89, S171). 
 
17 Locke, 18-19 (S25-S27).  Quote on 19 (S27). 
 
18 Locke, 19-21 (S27, S31-32). 
 
19 Locke, 23 (S36). 
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early nineteenth centuries was characterized by changes in the structure of English 
society.20  Industrial and commercial developments during the French Revolution (1789-
1799) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) left England with a growing middle class 
that clamored for political participation.  As Britain was industrializing in this period, 
manufacturing increased and a commercial economy began to take shape.  Wealth was 
becoming less attached to land and agriculture as new, fluid forms of capital emerged.  
This new capital and wealth was centered in the hands of a growing middle class, which 
felt that it too deserved political power and participation because of its stake in the 
economy.  The Great Reform Bill of 1832 enfranchised a large portion of the middle 
class by expanding the property qualification attached to male suffrage to include rented 
property of a minimum value as well as land.  The Reform Bill of 1832 also redistributed 
parliamentary seats to reflect population growth in industrial areas.21   
 Utilitarianism, first developed by Jeremy Bentham (1749-1832), proclaimed the 
maximization of happiness as the greatest good and rule for moral judgment.  Bentham 
held that “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
                                                 
20 Wilfrid Harrison, Conflict and Compromise: History of British Political Thought: 1593-1900 (New 
York: The Free Press, 1965), 29, 157. 
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(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958), 40-41, 43 and Christopher Harvie, 
“Revolution and the Rule of Law (1789-1851)” in The Oxford History of Britain ed. Kenneth O. Morgan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 470-505. 
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pain and pleasure.”22  Bentham defined utility as “that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to 
have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question” 
with every action being not only of “a private individual, but of every measure of 
government.”23  Bentham’s utilitarianism is at heart quantitative.  Determining the utility 
of an action involves a quantitative calculus provided by Bentham, which takes into 
account various aspects of the act itself, such as, intensity, duration, certainty, temporal 
proximity, fecundity, and purity, as well measurements of the persons affected.  The 
quantitative formula is essentially a sum of individual interests.24  Bentham’s philosophy 
was closely tied to the Philosophical Radicals, a group of utilitarians in politics who 
advocated radical reform including expansion of the franchise and middle class 
involvement in the government.25    
John Stuart Mill, the son of the Benthamite disciple, James Mill, articulated in 
Utilitarianism (1861) a refined version of the philosophy that shifted evaluations of 
happiness from a quantitative to a qualitative measure.  According to Mill, that which is 
                                                 
22 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation in The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill, 
ed. John Troyer (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003), 8. 
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24 Bentham, 9, 19-21. 
 
25 Schapiro, 42. 
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pleasurable is that which is valued in and for itself by those qualified, those having 
experience with greater and lesser pleasures, to judge that pleasure.  There are higher 
pleasures, those of the intellect or that are intrinsically human, and lower pleasures, those 
that are of the flesh.  Mill believed that people would, as a rule, desire the higher 
pleasures, but that did not make one pleasure greater than another.26   
Mill applied his utilitarianism to social and political matters in On Liberty (1859).  
Mill maintained that the highest principle was that of utility, or the maximization of 
happiness, but happiness for Mill required autonomous free choice.  Mill wrote, “The 
only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which 
concerns others.  In this part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.”27  Thus the only permissible restriction of the individual, by society or the 
state, was that which would prohibit one individual from harming another in such a way 
that that individual possessed a right to be free from.  According to Mill this principle 
translated into an individual’s freedom of thought and expression, freedom to live his life 
as he sees fit, and freedom to associate with others.28   
                                                 
26 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Oskar Priest (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
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27 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Currin V. Shields (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
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Mill’s qualitative measure of pleasure, belief in mankind’s inherent preference for 
the higher pleasures, and a system of liberty for the cultivation of autonomous 
individuality lends itself to the interpretation of Mill as an elitist or advocate of the rising 
middle class.  This is furthered by his advocacy of a system of universal suffrage that 
gave added weight to the votes of the educated, which would translate into the middle 
class possessing a greater voice in government.  Mill served in Parliament during the 
1860s, and, among other liberal causes, championed universal suffrage.  He even 
authored an amendment to the Reform Bill of 1867 to enfranchise women.29    
Mill valued individual liberty and rights as a means to maximize utility similar to 
the way those of the natural rights tradition also valued individual liberty and rights.  The 
only difference is that individual liberty and rights are less secure in the utilitarian 
tradition since they are subject to sacrifice on the basis of utility.  Locke and the natural 
law tradition suited the aristocracy’s bid for political power and participation while the 
utilitarian articulations of Bentham and Mill provided tools for the middle class to insert 
itself into the ranks of the ruling elite. 
 Just as the process of industrialization generated a new and growing middle class, 
which owned and operated the centers for manufacturing and production in Britain, 
industrialization also generated a new and growing working class composed of those 
individuals who flocked to the cities and manufacturing centers in order to produce goods 
in the emerging commercial economy.  Members of the working class, like their 
employers in the middle class, also desired political power and participation.  When the 
                                                 
29 Bramsted and Melhuish, 248 and Arblaster, 280 and 282. 
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Great Reform Bill of 1832 failed to include the working class, members of the working 
class took up the cause of Chartism.  Chartists wanted Parliament to pass the People’s 
Charter, which included male suffrage, the secret ballot, equal electoral districts, payment 
for members of Parliament, annual Parliaments, and the removal of property 
qualifications to serve in Parliament.  Though the People’s Charter was never passed, 
most of the working class was gradually enfranchised through the implementation of 
household suffrage in urban areas through the Reform Bill of 1867 and in agricultural 
areas through the Reform Bill of 1884.30   
The Britain Acton and Spencer knew was this mid-to-late nineteenth century 
Victorian, industrializing, urbanizing Britain.  Working-class demands for 
enfranchisement were a prominent feature of this period.  Acton and Spencer’s 
articulations of liberalism addressed the struggle over the circle of political power and 
participation and applied to this issue the fruits of nineteenth-century intellectual 
developments, such as evolutionary theory and historical consciousness.
 
30 Harvie, 498-499 and H. C. G. Matthew, “The Liberal Age (1851-1914)” in The Oxford History of Britain 
ed. Kenneth O. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 526-527. 
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II. The Evolution of Progress 
 
Notions of human progress, improvement, and development were prevalent in 
liberal thought extending back to the Enlightenment.  These themes persisted into the 
nineteenth century, but assumed an altered character through the mid-to-late-nineteenth-
century developments in biological theory, particularly evolutionary hypotheses such as 
those put forth by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882).  
Lord Acton and Herbert Spencer were not immune to the influence of these biological 
theories.  The intrusion of biological and evolutionary language and concepts into the 
discourse of progress is illustrated in the mid-to-late-nineteenth-century works of Acton 
and Spencer.  These works reveal that metaphors derived from biological and 
evolutionary theory shifted the nature of progress within liberalism from an emphasis on 
man’s reason and ability to master his environment to an inevitable development rooted 
in the natural world.  This undermined the classical liberal conceptual framework in 
which society was composed of individuals possessing a constant human nature 
characterized by reason.  Furthermore, this helped to introduce a new conceptual 
framework in which society was organicized, or conceived of as an entity in and of itself, 
and in which the nature of society and the individual was constantly changing.    
Eighteenth-century liberal political thought included a notion of progress as 
society’s inevitable movement towards increasing rationalization.  Man’s path to 
happiness and freedom lay in his ability to master his environment as revealed by natural 
science.  A well-known manifestation of eighteenth-century progress is the Marquis de 
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Condorcet’s (1743-1794) Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human 
Mind (1795) in which he discussed man’s linear progression towards perfection.1   
The theme of progress carried over into the nineteenth century and was given 
added complexity by intellectuals, such as G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), Karl Marx 
(1818-1883), and John Stuart Mill.  This was achieved partly through Hegel’s 
introduction of the concept of a dialectic within history, which was later applied to 
economic relations by Marx, and partly through Mill’s awareness of the potentially 
coercive influence of society and government on the individual.  These articulations of 
the theme of progress are more complex than earlier ones because the reasoned individual 
is interacting with the economy, technology, and social institutions in addition to the 
natural world.2  For these and other figures progress involved the application of 
individual reason both to the natural and manmade components of the individual’s 
surroundings.      
Evolution is, in its most general and basic articulation, the idea that the present is 
a product of the past and the future a product of the present; there is a process of 
becoming through which interactions with the environment give rise to a new phase of 
being.  This abstract articulation of evolution was familiar to Greek philosophers and 
extends through the works of David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), 
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and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832).  Thus there existed an evolutionary 
interpretation of history before any articulations of a scientific theory of evolution.3   
The early biologists, such as Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte (1707-1788) and 
Denis Diderot (1713-1784), advocated spontaneous generation, suggesting that life was 
made through Earth’s natural processes and change in an organism was a response to 
natural forces.  Other early biologists, such as Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) and 
Lamarck, articulated comprehensive theories of transmutation.4  Lamarck asserted in his 
Philosophie Zoologique (1809) a purposive evolution with unlimited possibilities for 
organic change.  According to Lamarck, an organism adapted to its environment and 
these acquired modifications were passed on to the next generation.  Lamarck gave the 
example of the giraffe whose neck elongated over time because it had to stretch in order 
to reach leaves high up in a tree.5   
Darwin, the best-known example of later evolutionary thought, articulated in The 
Origin of Species (1859) an accidental evolution in his theory of natural selection, which 
asserted that only those organisms most suited to an environment are able to survive and 
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breed thus assuring the continuance of the most advantageous characteristics.6  Darwin 
and his theory were highly controversial.  Historian James Moore, described Darwin’s 
contentious move:  
Darwin recast the living world in the image of competitive, industrial Britain.  He 
abandoned the Bible as a scientific authority and explained the origin of living 
things by divinely ordained natural laws.  Once destined for the church, he 
became the high priest of a new secular order, proclaiming a struggling, 
progressive, and law-bound nature to a struggling, improving, and law-abiding 
society.7 
 
Conservatives lashed out at Darwin’s theory of natural selection as the embodiment of 
the atheistic tendencies inherent to the evolution idea.  They felt it reduced mankind to 
the level of animals and made the world a product of accidental, purposeless change.  By 
the 1870s most scientists and educated individuals accepted evolution, but not necessarily 
the radical materialism of Darwin’s natural selection.  They were more likely to embrace 
a compromised version of Darwin in which a sense of purpose, or progress, was grafted 
onto natural selection.8 
 Evolutionary theory added a biological tone to liberal notions of progress while 
also significantly impacting the nature of political philosophy.  Prior to evolution’s 
impact on nineteenth-century political thought man was conceived of as possessing 
reason, natural rights, and other timeless attributes.  Human nature was a constant, and 
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the way to comprehend and theorize politics was to pose questions based on the 
assumption of certain essential, timeless human needs and characteristics.  With the 
emergence of evolutionary thought the older methods of constitutional analysis and 
political philosophy gave way to naturalistic analogies drawn from physiology, geology, 
paleontology, and other scientific disciplines.  Man came to be viewed as an 
accumulation of historically-chosen attributes and society as an accumulation of 
historically-chosen customs.  Both human nature and political relations came to be seen 
as flexible, malleable, and shaped by past environments and social demands.9  The world 
was no longer constant and immutable but plastic and ever-changing. 
 Occasionally connections are drawn between evolutionary thought and radicalism 
and racism in the nineteenth century.  The political and social impact of evolutionary 
thought in nineteenth-century Britain is often easily misconstrued in this manner.  Most 
evolutionary thinkers did exhibit a tendency towards liberal reform or left-wing activities, 
such as George Combe (1788-1858), Charles Darwin, Alfred Russell Wallace (1823-
1913), and Herbert Spencer.  Liberal intellectuals, who were skeptical of the way in 
which ideas of a divinely-ordered universe were used to support a conservative, 
hierarchal social order, tended to support evolution for the way in which it cast human 
nature and social institutions as dynamic and variable rather than static and immutable.  
Yet there were evolutionists, such as Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888), who were 
conservative, not radical.  In fact, many conservatives and radicals accepted evolution, 
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but neither desired a world entirely the product of chance.  Instead they embraced an 
evolution guided by a divine plan or natural laws for beneficial and moral change.10   
Late-nineteenth-century British evolutionists are also sometimes confused as 
racists because of the development of social Darwinism and late-nineteenth-century 
continental, particularly German and Austrian, interpretations of evolution that 
emphasized competitive doctrines and racial hierarchies.  Furthermore, these ideas were 
derived, in part, from ideas other than evolution, such as phrenology.  These ideas were 
less prevalent and influential in England where Darwinian natural selection was often 
given a minor role and less combative theories were favored.11  This does not mean that 
British intellectuals did not sometimes espouse racist viewpoints, such as racially-based 
justifications for imperialism, but that evolutionary thought in Britain was not of a wholly 
racist character. 
 Evolutionary thought in England was generally neither radical nor racist, though 
examples of both can be found.  Its greatest impact was in the critique of traditional 
political philosophy and politics.  The advent of evolutionary thought discredited appeals 
to universal truth, reason, and utility.  It also helped to unseat the ‘classic texts’ of 
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Bentham whose political theories were based on a conception of 
human nature as universal and static.  Ultimately, English evolutionists were critics of 
philosophy who desired to ground the political and social order on the newly-developing 
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sciences, such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology, instead of philosophical 
speculation.12 
 It is the mark evolutionary thought left on political language and political 
understanding that is exhibited in Acton and Spencer.  In particular, they conceived of 
liberal progress less in terms of individual reason and achievement and more in terms of a 
product of the natural world.  In order to see this influence at work in Acton and Spencer 
a general understanding of each figure’s worldview and theory of progress is required.  
Acton’s use of evolutionary language is muted in comparison to that of Spencer and does 
not fully emerge until his discussion of the state, but his ideas regarding the state cannot 
be understood without first knowing his worldview and general theory of progress. 
Acton’s worldview and theory of progress was heavily influenced by his identity 
as a liberal Catholic.  Acton was active in the liberal Catholic movement, which was 
opposed to Ultramontanism, or the segment of opinion in the Catholic Church advocating 
centralization of power and institutions within the church, the supremacy of ecclesiastical 
over temporal authority, and papal infallibility.13  Acton published articles on Catholic 
issues in journals, such as The Rambler from which much of the following is drawn from, 
from the 1850s until the conclusion of the Vatican Council of 1869-70 when, rather than 
leave the Church over the issue of papal infallibility, he withdrew from Catholic affairs.14   
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Acton rejected the older, and often anti-Catholic, liberal conception of progress as 
man achieving happiness and freedom through mastery of his environment with the tools 
of natural science.  In Acton’s eyes this was progress as “the religion of those that have 
none.”15  Acton was not hostile to these thinkers though.  He acknowledged these men, 
including Leslie Stephen (1832-1904), Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), Jeremy Bentham, 
Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill as the “Fathers” of the 
“liberal Church” and valued them for their appreciation of toleration, universal education, 
and freedom of the press – an appreciation Acton also held.16   
Acton’s worldview and theory of progress is a complex synthesis of several 
seemingly discordant themes drawn from his appreciation of liberal political thought and 
his deeply held religious beliefs and Catholic identity.  The following excerpt from an 
unpublished and undated note provides a glimpse of these themes: 
Providence means progress – notion that God is active in history – that Christ 
pursues his work among men – that His action is not wasted.  Grace granted to 
individuals in vain.  But Providence watching over history not in vain.  Now 
Liberty supposes progress.  It is an overcoming of what exists, development of 
potentials, destruction of actual.  Progress, practically, a modern idea.  It comes in 
with science.17 
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Acton blended history, liberty, science, and religion into an idea of progress.  There is an 
echo of an Hegelian conception of history through which God is at work to realize ever 
greater states of progress, an idea Acton would have been familiar with from his 
education under the Ignaz von Döllinger at the University of Munich.  Acton saw signs of 
this progress in the development and advance of liberty in the face of authoritarian 
control and oppression.  The greatest realization yet of this progress was the period of 
scientific investigation and discovery that Acton witnessed. 
 A grasp of Acton’s conception of liberty is necessary in order to understand how 
Acton could synthesize such discordant themes into a coherent theory of progress.  Acton 
defined liberty as “the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he 
believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion.”18  
For a man to be in a state of liberty he must possess the freedom of action necessary to do 
that which he believes he must do.  For this freedom of action to be possible the 
individual requires, as similarly expressed by John Stuart Mill, protection against the 
force exerted by existing authorities, majorities, customs, and opinions.   
Acton’s Catholic faith inspired his definition of liberty from which followed the 
separation of the world into various spheres of influence.  He wrote in the essay “Political 
Thoughts on the Church” (1859):   
The Christian notion of conscience imperatively demands a corresponding 
measure of personal liberty.  The feeling of duty and responsibility to God is the 
only arbiter of a Christian’s actions.  With this no human authority can be 
permitted to interfere.  We are bound to extend to the utmost, and to guard from 
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every encroachment, the sphere in which we can act in obedience to the sole voice 
of conscience, regardless of any other consideration.19 
 
Again individual liberty encompasses the freedom of action necessary to allow the 
individual to follow the dictates of his conscience.  This definition of liberty, as suggested 
above, necessitates the division of the world into two separate spheres: the political and 
the religious.  The existence of two distinct spheres promotes liberty while thwarting the 
rise of absolutism.20  The state’s domain is the political sphere in which it “is competent 
to assign duties and draw the line between good and evil only in its immediate sphere.”21  
The state’s “immediate sphere” is that which is necessary for its continuation and good 
health.  Otherwise the state “can only give indirect help to fight the battle of life by 
promoting the influences which prevail against temptation – religion, education, and the 
distribution of wealth,” or that which helps the individual follow the dictates of his own 
conscience.22  The religious sphere naturally falls to the Church.  It was once held that 
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the Church required the state and its well being was contingent on state favor, but, 
according to Acton, the real connection between Church and state, the political and
religious spheres, is reversed.  Acton stated, “it is the State which stands in need of the 
Church, and that the strength of the Church is her independence…A free Church implie
a free nation
 
s 
.”23   
                                                
The Church as guardian of the religious sphere and, by extension, the support of 
the political sphere has obligations to fulfill to both the individual and the state.  In this 
regard, Acton maintained that “the Church has to remind princes of their duties, and 
nations of their rights; and to keep alive the spirit of personal dignity and independence, 
without which the religious and the political character of men are alike degraded.”24  
Discharging this duty hinges on religious doctrine as Acton explained in 1859: 
The Church which our Lord came to establish had a twofold mission to fulfill.  
Her system of doctrine, on the one hand, had to be defined and perpetually 
maintained.  But it was also necessary that it should prove itself more than a mere 
matter of theory – that it should pass into practice, and command the will as well 
as the intellect of men.  It was necessary not only to restore the image of God in 
man, but to establish the divine order in the world.  Religion had to transform the 
public as well as the private life of nations, to effect a system of public right 
corresponding with private morality.25 
 
 
23 Lord Acton, “The Count de Montalembert (1858),” in Selected Writings of Lord Acton Volume III: 
Essays in Religion, Politics, and Morality, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 1988), 
9-10. 
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The Church then is to encourage in the political sphere the protection of the freedom of 
action necessary in which the individual may follow the dictates of his conscience while 
also helping the individual to keep his conscience in line with the divine will.  The 
Church in its religious sphere is a promoter of liberty, which is the realization of God in 
the world and an ever increasing progress in history. 
A pressing issue in the nineteenth century, made more pressing by the 
development of evolutionary thought, was the meeting of religion and science.  Acton 
witnessed Catholic attempts to disprove evolutionary theory despite its compatibility with 
the Church given the Church’s flexible criteria for biblical interpretation.26  He was also 
well aware of the usual conflict that developed in the intersection of religious and 
scientific thought, and felt this conflict to be largely unnecessary.  Amongst those who 
opposed science in the name of religion and those who opposed religion in the name of 
science Acton saw a “fatal notion of the incompatibility of faith and reason.”27   Acton 
also saw ulterior motives at work, as stated in “The Catholic Press” (1859): 
In reality this pretence of antagonism is on neither side sincere.  Solicitude for 
religion is merely a pretext for opposition to the free course of scientific research, 
which threatens, not the authority of the Church, but the precarious influence of 
individuals.  The growth of knowledge cannot in the long run be detrimental to 
religion; but it renders impossible the usurpation of authority by teachers who 
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defend their own false opinions under pretence of defending the faith which they 
dishonour by their artifices.28 
 
The antagonism maintained between religion and science is, according to Acton, an 
obstacle to liberty.   
Acton strongly advocated a union of the Church and science.  He argued along 
similar lines to John Stuart Mill’s impassioned pleas for freedom of speech and 
expression: “A really scientifically learned work, written without any religious interest, 
helps the truth in spite of its author; whilst a superficial apology will do little or no good, 
and probably some harm, in spite of the zeal and good intention with which it is 
written.”29  Truth, liberty, and the Catholic faith would be best served in the long term 
through the friendly association of religion and science. 
 Acton’s theory of progress was, simply put, an ever increasing liberty.  Acton’s 
version of liberty, though, was a state of affairs in which the individual has the freedom 
of action necessary to do that which he believes is right, his duty, or God’s will.  Acton’s 
variety of liberty necessitates a division of the world into the political and religious – a 
distinction whose existence protects liberty while thwarting absolutism.  The political 
sphere entails the domain of the state limited to actions necessary for its preservation and 
encouragements to right action amongst individuals.  The Church, whose domain is the 
religious sphere, supports the state.  The Church also upholds doctrine and truth through 
which it uplifts the individual and encourages a public morality on par with the private.  
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As the guardian and promulgator of truth, the Church should welcome scientific 
investigation as its ally because all efforts to discern truth further the cause of liberty.  
Acton’s theory of progress in general superimposes his faith on the older theme of liberal 
progress to generate an almost perplexing synthesis of history, liberty, religion, and 
science. 
 Much of Acton’s discussion of the state in relation to society and his theory of 
progress originated from his awareness of the growth of nationalism in Europe.  In these 
discussions Acton employed a subtle usage of evolutionary language.  In “Report on 
Current Events, July 1860,” he stated:   
The State is not a natural emanation of the nation, but a product of intelligent 
thought; and is adapted to the people to whom it belongs.  But while the particular 
State is a result of human design, society is more immediately subject to the 
Divine will.  It is less under the control of man, and moves, under the guidance of 
Providence…Now God guides the world by the power of what are called natural 
laws, which men cannot alter or divert…Society is ever growing, independently 
of human design, and slowly but constantly modifying and developing its forms.30 
 
Men, societies, and nations are not progressing closer to perfection through reason and 
mastery of the environment through the revelations of science.  Society, a concept devoid 
of any political connotation, is from God, the natural product of His working through the 
natural laws that govern His creation.  Society, this work of God, grows and develops and 
changes slowly and naturally.  In 1860, Acton described progress:   
This incessant growth supplies the progressive element in the State, which is 
moulded upon society and follows its variations.  Political progress is a process of 
adaptation, not a result of speculation.  This distinguishes reform from revolution.  
One is the change produced by the pressure of existing facts, the other by the 
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influence of ideas without reference to facts.  Government has thus to follow the 
example of nature in her operations, and to proceed regularly, organically; by 
evolution, not by change.31 
 
The State is the political representation of society and a creation of man.  Ideally it should 
mirror society and society’s natural evolution.  If the State succeeds in personifying the 
organicism and evolution of society, then it too is progressing.  Looking beyond Acton’s 
theology, the traditional liberal theme of progress remains, but it is transformed, through 
the use of biological and evolutionary themes, from a product of man’s individual reason 
and conscious development into the developmental course of an organicized society, a 
society that is itself an entity, governed by forces beyond man’s control.   
 Acton’s usage of evolutionary language was secondary to his thought and low key 
in expression, but for Spencer evolutionary thought served as the underpinning of his 
worldview and the theory of progress he articulated in his works, particularly in Social 
Statistics (1851).  At the root of Spencer’s worldview is the assertion that human 
happiness is the Divine will.  This reference to the divine does not hold the meaning such 
references held for Acton because, despite a heavily religious upbringing, Spencer had an 
ambivalent relationship with organized religion.32  Spencer defined happiness as a state 
of consciousness that is the result of the exercise of an individual’s faculties.  In order to 
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fulfill the Divine will an individual must exercise his faculties.33  This duty presupposes a 
certain freedom of action out of which Spencer derived his Law of Equal Freedom, or 
Moral Law: “Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the 
equal freedom of any other man.”34  The Law of Equal Freedom is grounded in man’s 
selfish instinct to assert his right to an equal amount of liberty, or, in other words, to lay 
claim to individual rights.  The Law of Equal Freedom is also grounded in the sympathy 
the individual has for his fellow man, which inspires the individual to claim for others the 
individual rights he desires for himself.35   
In Spencer’s worldview man is governed by the Law of Equal Freedom, or the 
Moral Law, but there is a discrepancy between the mandates of this law and reality.  Out 
of this gap emerges Spencer’s theory of progress.  In order to attain the social state, or 
civilization, individuals must fulfill the Moral Law.  According to Spencer, man has yet 
to become adapted to the social state and the Moral Law.36   Spencer asserted, “Strange 
indeed would it be, if, in the midst of this universal mutation, man alone were constant, 
unchangeable.  But it is not so.  He also obeys the law of indefinite variation.  His 
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circumstances are ever altering; and he is ever adapting himself to them.”37  Man is 
adaptable, and man’s capacity for adaptation allows him to become fitted to the Moral 
Law.  This transition to compatibility with the Moral Law and the social state is progress 
in Spencer’s view.38  Spencer applied the biological concept of the adaptability of 
organisms to their environments to individuals as they become fitted to living in social 
arrangements.  The process of man’s adaptation to the social state is Spencer’s theory of 
progress.  Spencer, like Acton, took the liberal theme of progress out of the hands of the 
individual and transformed it into a natural process discernible in the laws of nature. 
Spencer’s Moral Law is an ideal, the dictates of perfection.  Similar to the 
traditional liberal theme of progress, Spencer’s theory of progress includes a development 
towards perfection.  According to Spencer, “the condition of things dictated by the law of 
equal freedom…that condition towards which…mankind are progressing, is a condition 
towards which the whole creation tends.”39  The Moral Law, or perfection, is the trend of 
creation.  Drawing on observations of organisms in the natural world and the work of the 
German biologist Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876), who asserted that embryonic 
development progressed from the homogenous to the heterogeneous, Spencer saw an 
increasing complexity of life.  He interpreted this increasing complexity as a progression 
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towards individuality of which man is the highest manifestation.40  Perfection under the 
Moral Law is more complex than increasing individuality.  Along these lines Spencer 
wrote:   
Yet must this highest individuation be joined with the greatest mutual 
dependence.  Paradoxical though the assertion looks, the progress is at once 
complete separateness and complete union.  But the separateness is of a kind 
consistent with the most complex combinations for fulfilling social wants; and the 
union is of a kind that does not hinder entire development of each 
personality…He will be that manner of man, who, in spontaneously fulfilling his 
own nature, incidentally performs the functions of a social unit; and yet is only 
enabled so to fulfill his own nature, by all others doing the like.41   
 
Mankind is, in Spencer’s view, progressing to a condition in which each individual may 
fully realize his individuality while also being a part of society and an instrument in the 
fulfillment of his fellow citizens.  This is a development to a state of perfection not 
through individual effort and means but as natural adaptation to and fulfillment of a 
natural law. 
Spencer’s idea of perfection hinges not only on individual adaptation to the moral 
law, but also on society as a whole.  Like Acton, Spencer’s discussion of society centered 
on biological metaphor as illustrated in the following excerpt from Social Statistics: 
Still more clearly seen is this ultimate identity of personal interests and social 
interests, when we discover how essentially vital is the connection between each 
person and the society of which he is a unit…So completely, however, is a society 
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organized upon the same system as an individual being, that we may almost say 
there is something more than analogy between them.42 
 
For Spencer society is an organism composed of the individuals within it.  It is not 
enough for one individual to become adapted to the Moral Law for “he must see that his 
own life can become what it should be, only as fast as society becomes what it should 
be…no one can be perfectly free till all are free; no one can be perfectly moral till all are 
moral; no one can be perfectly happy till all are happy.”43  Spencer’s theory of progress, 
mankind’s adaptation to the Moral Law, to a state of perfection, does not rely on 
individual reason and conscious effort to conform to an ideal.  Rather it relies on 
individuals and society as a whole naturally adapting to a natural law. 
 The theme of progress was a component of early liberal, or classical liberal, 
thought.  Among classical liberals progress was conceived of as the individual, an 
inherently reasonable being, using his reason to discern the laws governing the world 
around him and then using that knowledge to master and mold his environment.  Over the 
course of the nineteenth century, biological and evolutionary thought and language 
seeped into political thought, understanding, and discourse.  Biological and evolutionary 
thought and language changed the nature of the liberal theme of progress, a shift that is 
evident in the work of Acton and Spencer.  Progress was no longer a product of man’s 
individual reason and effort, but rather the product of a natural, inevitable development 
on an individual and societal level governed by natural forces beyond the individual’s 
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control.  This marks a step away from a classical liberal conceptual framework of 
individual agency and a movement towards a new conceptual framework of an 
organicized society and historicized individuals and societies. 
 50
III. Historical Consciousness 
 
 History, like many other branches of knowledge, became a professionalized 
discipline in the nineteenth century.  The practice of history shifted from an 
Enlightenment emphasis on empiricism, rationalism, and universal law, including reason 
and natural rights, to a Romantic fixation with inevitable organic growth and continuity 
with the past.  Though Enlightenment empiricism and rationalism carried over into the 
nineteenth century in the form of positivism, they met with strong resistance from 
Romanticism.  Romanticism and historicism, the Romantic school of historiography, 
focused on continuity with the past and the need to understand each epoch and society in 
its own terms.  The historical consciousness, characterized by the competing approaches 
of positivism and historicism, that developed in the nineteenth century undermined the 
classical liberal conceptual framework of society as reasoned individuals of a constant 
nature and helped to usher in a new conceptual framework of an organicized society and 
individuals and societies as dynamic outgrowths of the past.  
Lord Acton and Herbert Spencer operated in the midst of these developments and 
their work sheds light on the emergence of historical consciousness in nineteenth-century 
Britain.  As an historian, Lord Acton was well-known for his knowledge and library.  He 
was educated in the German states, the heart of historiographical development in the 
nineteenth century, contributed historical articles and reviews in various English journals, 
and served as the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1895 to 1902.  
Acton engaged the prevailing historical conceptions of his time, positivism and 
historicism, saw the implications they held for liberty, and sought to popularize a method 
of historical scholarship that preserved and furthered liberty.   
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Herbert Spencer, as a self-proclaimed sociologist working to establish and define 
the discipline, eschewed the historical discipline altogether.1  Spencer attempted to 
reduce all of human behavior and the human sciences to a set of natural laws, which he 
articulated in the Synthetic Philosophy.  Though Spencer considered himself engaging in 
science, he failed to avoid entirely the historical discipline and his work reflected both 
positivist and historicist thought. 
 The French Revolution was for the practice of history, as it was in several other 
areas, a transformative event.  It was initially interpreted as a triumph of Enlightenment 
values, such as reason and empiricism.  Positivism was an outgrowth of eighteenth-
century Enlightenment rationalism.  Positivists held that man was a rational, though not 
necessarily always reasonable, being.  They also believed in the existence of objective 
truth that was discernable through reason as employed in the scientific method of 
research, experimentation, and verification.  History, according to positivists, was a 
branch of natural science and should be practiced as such.  The positivist historian 
conceived his task to be the observation of a mass of isolated facts comprising history 
and existing in a world separate from himself.  From these observations he should be able 
to classify his facts in such a way as to identify patterns and make predictions.  Thus 
positivists attempted to subject human behavior to immutable, universal laws in the same 
manner in which they attempted to subject nature to immutable, universal laws.2  Jeremy 
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Bentham, the aforementioned utilitarian and early nineteenth-century liberal, was also a 
positivist.  He believed all human behavior was governed by the principles of pain and 
pleasure and sought to establish a system of legislation and social order on the principle 
of utility.  Positivist thought, with its emphasis on individual reason and natural law, had 
a strong affinity with classical liberal thought. 
  Romanticism, a philosophy glorifying the emotional, aesthetic, and imaginative, 
emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution and challenged the spread of 
Enlightenment values and positivism.  Within Romanticism there developed a specific 
conception of history known as historicism.  Its origin and heart lay in the German 
universities of the nineteenth century and was fueled by the work of Barthold Georg 
Niebuhr (1776-1831) and Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) among others.  Historicists 
turned away from the Enlightenment preoccupation with fixed concepts, such as reason, 
justice, and universal laws, to focus attention on continuous organic growth and the 
bearing of the past on the present.  Rather than, as was typical of Enlightenment and 
positivist historiography, examine the general in history, depict history in mechanical 
terms, and be judgmental of the content of history, Romantic historiography examined 
the specific in history, depicted history in organic terms, and was sympathetic to the 
content of history.3     
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 Historicism served as an impetus for the professionalization of history.  Prior to 
the nineteenth century, historical writing was largely literary or learned and antiquarian in 
nature – this was the practice of the “man of letters,” not yet the historian.  What 
historicists did was combine an emphasis on knowledge – the learned not the antiquarian 
– with a belief in the necessity of literary style.  Imagination was thought of as essential 
to the historical enterprise because through feeling and sympathy the historian could 
relive the past and through literary creation revive the past.  These professionalized 
historians wrote to advance knowledge within the discipline not to educate or entertain 
the general public.4  The professionalization of history involved not only changes in the 
nature of historical writing, but also changes in the nature of historical practices, such as 
the application of the methodology of scientific disciplines, including natural science, to 
the study of history.  This introduced an emphasis on research, objectivity, and 
impartiality to historical studies.  By transforming history into a professionalized and 
scientific discipline, historicists attempted to give historical studies the authority and 
legitimacy of the physical and natural sciences.5 
 Historicism was more than history as science – it was philosophical as well.  It 
conceived of the past as a phase in human history rather than a static and finished 
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product.  History to the historicist was a continuously developing reality – it was the flow 
of time and the historian was in the midst of it.  Thus the course of life itself became 
subject matter for historical study.  Historicists also believed that the past could 
foreshadow the future, so the historian was to search for origins in order to understand 
what followed.  Historians occasionally refer to historicism as the genetic movement in 
history because of its belief in history as an organic development with origins holding the 
key to all subsequent development.6  The historicist added to the science of history – an 
inductive and systematic study of data – a philosophical twist – the revelation of patterns, 
including the work of God in history, and laws from fact in order to give unity to the past, 
to guide the present, and to predict the future.7   
For much of the nineteenth century, Britain seemed to lag behind the German 
states in the study of history.  Initially, British historiography was narrowly focused on 
British national history and was largely conducted by “men of letters,” such as, Thomas 
Babington Macaulay (1800-1859), Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), James Anthony Froude 
(1818-1894), Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-1892), Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-
1862), William Edward Hartpole Lecky (1838-1903), and John Richard Green (1837-
1883).  The professionalization and institutionalization of history was slow in Britain, and 
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Germanic influences did not enter until the late nineteenth century with William Stubbs 
(1825-1901), John Robert Seeley (1834-1895), and Acton.8   
Acton’s British and continental background allowed him to be one of the figures 
to introduce German scholarship to British historiography and enabled him to actively 
engage the historiographical developments of the nineteenth century.  Acton was heir, 
through his father, Sir Ferdinand Richard Edward Acton, to a long line of Shropshire 
baronets, who converted to Catholicism only a few generations prior to Acton’s birth.  As 
a result of restrictions imposed upon Catholics, several of Acton’s relatives were active in 
continental Europe, including his grandfather, Sir John Acton, who served as Prime 
Minister under the Bourbon King of Naples.  Acton’s father died when he was three years 
old, and his mother married Acton’s stepfather, Lord Granville, the influential Liberal-
Whig politician and Liberal Leader of the House of Lords.   Acton’s mother was Marie 
Pelline de Dahlberg, the daughter and heiress of the Duc de Dahlberg, a German noble 
family.  Unable to attend university in England because of his Catholic faith, Acton 
studied under the Catholic historian Ignaz von Döllinger at the University of Munich 
from 1850 to 1857.  At the same time he reaffirmed his connections with his German 
family through his cousin, the Countess Arco, whose daughter he married.9   
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Döllinger, a specialist in Church history, was himself an active figure in German 
historicism.  His work included a primer on Church history published in 1840 and a 
three-volume work on the Reformation published between 1846 and 1848.10  Acton 
learned from Döllinger that dogma tended to change over time so it was better to view 
Christianity as a history, or development, rather than as a doctrinal, or philosophical, 
system.  Both men strongly opposed the doctrine of papal infallibility adopted at the 
Vatican Council of 1869-70.  Döllinger was excommunicated for his opposition to papal 
infallibility while Acton was only threatened with excommunication.  This facilitated 
Acton’s withdrawal from Catholic affairs.  Afterwards, Acton diverted his attention more 
fully to historical matters.11  
Acton’s conception of history can be divided into five components.  First, there is 
an idea of romantik in which the historian is to identify with the course of history.12  As 
Acton described it in a book review published in 1858:   
Each event and period of history must be viewed in its own native light.  It is the 
business of historians every where to furnish us with this light, without which 
each object is distorted and discoloured.  We are unable, and care not, to 
understand and sympathise with them.  The true view of history is the reverse of 
this narrowness.  Its chief purpose is to break down the idolatry of a particular age 
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and stage of development, and to awaken a generous catholic appreciation of 
mankind in every period and phase of its existence.13 
 
Secondly, there is liberalism in which the historian views history from a standpoint 
outside of history.14  The result is that “wherein history is liberal: [it] [t]eaches disrespect, 
shows up horrors, follies, errors, crimes of the ablest and the best.”15  When liberalism 
overcomes romantik, the third component of Acton’s conception of history, the 
contemporaneity of history comes into being.  This is also known as modern history, 
which is the product of revolution and the fourth component of Acton’s view of history.16 
Acton described modern history and its revolutionary break with the past in “The Study 
of History” (1895):   
Modern history…which is marked off by an evident and intelligible line from the 
time immediately preceding, and displays in its course specific and distinctive 
characteristics of its own…did not proceed…by normal succession…Unheralded, 
it founded a new order of things, under a law of innovation, sapping the ancient 
reign of continuity.17 
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It is a break with the past brought on by knowledge of the past because, as Acton stated, 
“if the Past has been an obstacle and a burden, knowledge of the Past is the safest and the 
surest emancipation.”18  Lastly, history serves as the agent of progress because, in 
Acton’s words, “That is what history does for us.  It gives us the line of progress, the 
condition of progress, the demonstration of error.”19   
Just as Acton developed his own conception of history, he also kept himself 
abreast of the historiographical developments of his period, including positivism of which 
he disapproved.  He detested positivism because he believed that rationalism cannot teach 
sympathy, which is necessary for the historian to understand and experience the past.  
Furthermore, positivism served as an obstruction in the historian’s attempt to view 
development and change by limiting history to a set of unchanging scientific laws.20  
Other liberals reacted negatively to the empiricism, rationalism, and dispassionate and 
distant perspective of positivism.  This backlash against positivism included John Stuart 
Mill, the famous nineteenth-century liberal, who added aspects of Romantic thought to 
Bentham’s positivistic utilitarianism thus incorporating a qualitative component into the 
hedonic calculus. 
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Though Acton was more accepting of aspects of Romantic thought than he was of 
positivism, he was still critical of historicism.  Acton believed in the importance of 
sympathizing with and experiencing the past, but he was distrustful of the relativistic 
tendencies of historicism.  The historicist approach to history included the idea that 
whatever happens in history is legitimized upon its becoming history.  To Acton this idea 
neglected values that stood outside of history, namely an absolute moral standard and 
human dignity, by reducing the individual to an historical being and stripping all value 
from individual action.21  Acton dismissively described this trend in historicist writing, 
“Mobility in the moral code, subjection of man to environment, indefinite allowance for 
date and race, are standing formulas from Schlegel to the realistic philosophy.”22  The 
result of which is, according to Acton, “the strong man with the dagger is followed by the 
weaker man with the sponge.  First, the criminal who slays; then the sophist who defends 
the slayer.”23  Acton believed that the historian was charged with judging history 
according to an absolute moral standard that existed independent of history: “To judge – 
                                                 
21 Kochan, 41, 43-44. 
 
22 Lord Acton, “German Schools in History (1886)” in Selected Writings of Lord Acton Volume II: Essays 
in the Study and Writing of History, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 1986), 334. 
 
23 Lord Acton, “Selections from the Acton Legacy: Lectures on the French Revolution, p. 92” in Selected 
Writings of Lord Acton Volume III: Essays in Religion, Politics, and Morality, ed. J. Rufus Fears 
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 1988), 630. 
 
 60
try – the cause of history and politics, which is living history, not by physical or 
metaphysical, but by a moral standard.”24   
It was Acton’s disapproval of the relativism he perceived to be inherent in 
Romantic thought that brought about his estrangement from Döllinger.  Acton faulted 
Döllinger for following the Romantic outlook and approaching history in a manner in 
which Döllinger immersed himself in the epoch of his subject and measured individuals 
only according to the standards of their respective periods.  In Acton’s opinion, Döllinger 
as an historian was more apt to explain than to judge history and when forced to judge to 
temper that judgment with mercy.  This was an unforgivable act on the part of an 
historian according to Acton, who asserted, “To commit murder is the work of a moment 
– exceptional.  To defend it is a constant and shows a more perverted conscience.”25    On 
the other hand, Döllinger saw a pretension to moral righteousness in Acton’s insistence 
on the historian’s obligation to judge the past according to an independent and absolute 
moral standard.26  To which Acton responded in 1895:     
                                                 
24 Lord Acton, “Selections from the Acton Legacy: Add. Mss. 4956, p. 114” in Selected Writings of Lord 
Acton Volume III: Essays in Religion, Politics, and Morality, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Liberty Fund, 1988), 630. 
 
25 Lord Acton, “Selections from the Acton Legacy: Add. Mss. 4939, p. 74” in Selected Writings of Lord 
Acton Volume III: Essays in Religion, Politics, and Morality, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Liberty Fund, 1988), 630. 
 
26 Himmelfarb, 148. 
 
 61
But the weight of opinion is against me when I exhort you never to debase the 
moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final 
maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape 
the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong.27 
 
Acton believed in the existence of an absolute moral standard so that what is wrong today 
was also wrong in the past.  It is the job of the historian to bring this moral standard to 
bear on the past. 
Acton’s other discrepancy with historicism was its nationalist tendency.  
Nationalism, the idea that a group of people sharing a common culture, language, and 
history should govern themselves, grew in popularity throughout Europe following the 
French Revolution.  Nationalist movements threatened the Austrian and Ottoman 
Empires and helped drive the unification of Italy in 1870 and of Germany in 1871.  
Nationalist sentiment also helped to motivate in the late nineteenth century the increasing 
military, economic, and imperial competition between Britain and other European 
powers, such as France and Germany.28   
As history became increasingly professionalized through historicism, historical 
writing tended to become more ideological in nature – a development running parallel to 
the growth of nationalism throughout the nineteenth century.  The historicist conception 
of science applied to historical study became tied to the historian’s conception of the 
ideal political and social order.  In other words, historicists embarked upon their 
historical investigations with a definite notion of the proper nature of politics and society 
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and then constructed histories in support of these opinions.29  This was a bias that could 
enter into historical investigation both intentionally and unintentionally.  For example, 
several German writers in the build up to German unification glorified the state and 
advocated a united Germany.   
Acton was firmly opposed to any such influence on the part of the historian.  
Acton said of the objectivity of the historian, “my theory is that in history the historian 
has to disappear and leave the facts and ideas objectively to their own effect,” “the writer 
must put aside his private convictions,” and “ideas which, in religion and in politics, are 
truths, in history are forces.”30  Furthermore, he described the “historian’s maxim” as “to 
do the best he can for the other side, and to avoid pertinacity or emphasis on his own.”31  
Thus the historian, in Acton’s eyes, is given the difficult, if not impossible, task of 
leaving all bias behind in order to grasp the past for what it really was.     
The historian Edward Tulluch described Acton’s perception of nationalism within 
German historicism in his analysis of Lord Acton’s “German Schools in History (1886)” 
published in the inaugural issue of the English Historical Review.  According to Tulloch, 
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Acton identified three sources from which nineteenth-century German historiography 
arose.  First, Acton cited Niebuhr’s and Ranke’s critical investigation of primary sources.  
Acton singled out Ranke for pursuing history for history’s sake rather than for politics, 
law, or religion and for instructing others in the method of approaching and using 
sources.32  Secondly, Acton noted Hegel’s development of a dialectic founded in 
historical evolution.  According to Acton, Hegel presented all of history as a scientific 
unity or the manifestation of one force producing successively greater works.33  Lastly, 
Acton noted Romanticism’s contribution to nineteenth-century German historiography.  
Romanticism, according to Acton, was the effort of German intellectuals to repel the 
ideas of the eighteenth-century French philosophes, such as eternal justice, infallible 
conscience, and universal and unwritten law, which came with the French invasion of the 
German states in 1794.  The Romantics looked to the past in order to glorify faith and 
imagination in the face of reason and to restore the natural order through an emphasis on 
continuous, organic growth.34   
According to Tulloch, Acton perceived, following the failed revolutions of 1848, 
a turn towards nationalism in German historical writing.  Acton identified a group of 
historians led primarily by Heinrich von Sybel (1817-1895), Johann Gustav Droysen 
(1808-1886), and Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), but also Theodor Mommsen 
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(1817-1903), Heinrich Rudolf von Gneist (1816-1895), and Friedrich von Bernhardi 
(1849-1930), who were centered in Berlin and worked to establish the supremacy of 
Prussia among the German states.35  Acton’s disapproval of nationalism within 
historicism was not confined German scholarship.  He also found material to disapprove 
of within British historiography, such as ideas concerning organic continuities and racial 
destinies in the work of E. A. Freeman, Goldwyn Smith (1823-1910), and James Bryce 
(1838-1922).36 
Acton fervently opposed nationalism, viewing it as a non-historical contrivance 
and threat to liberty.  As he explained in a book review published in 1862, nationalism 
and the rise of the nation-state were manmade, ahistorical constructs because in these: 
The state of nature, which was the ideal of society, was made the basis of the 
nation; descent was put in the place of tradition, and the French people was 
regarded as a physical product: an ethnological, not historic, unit…The definition 
of the nation was borrowed from the material world, and, in order to avoid a loss 
of territory, it became not only an abstraction but a fiction.37   
 
Furthermore:    
The political theory of nationality is in contradiction with the historic nation.  
Since a nation derives its ideas and instincts of government, as much as its 
temperament and its language, from God, acting through the influences of nature 
and of history, these ideas and instincts are originally and essentially peculiar to 
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it, and not separable from it; they have no practical value in themselves when 
divided from the capacity which corresponds to them.38   
 
Acton feared that since nationalism was ahistorical, meaning that it was not in line with 
the natural, organic development of society led by God described in the previous chapter, 
nationalism would allow the political sphere, the state, to overcome the religious sphere, 
the Church, and lead to a tyranny of the majority – all unacceptable concentrations of 
power and examples of absolutism contrary to the progress of liberty.39 
While Acton’s conception of the historical discipline reflected much within 
historicism he deviated from the relativistic and nationalistic tendencies of historicism to 
preserve his conception of progress as the continual growth of liberty as defined by the 
individual possessing the freedom of action necessary to follow his conscience, or what 
he perceives to be God’s will.  Acton asserted in 1895: 
…see that the action of Christ who is risen on mankind whom he redeemed fails 
not, but increases; that the wisdom of divine rule appears not in the perfection but 
in the improvement of the world and that achieved liberty is the one ethical result 
that rests on the converging and combined conditions of advancing civilization.  
Then you will understand what a famous philosopher said, that history is the true 
demonstration of religion.40 
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For Acton, God existed outside of and within history and “[we] see in the laws of history 
the sign of wisdom of divine Providence.”41  God is within history in the way that 
distinctions are made between truth and error as well as virtue and sin and the way in 
which it is possible for error and sin to be done away with in the world.  God is also at the 
end of history waiting for the realization of liberty.  History is then given meaning 
defined against an absolute and fixed moral standard and given purpose by fulfilling the 
ends imposed upon it by God.  This conception of history allows the historian to be both 
a critic of the past and to look forward to the future.42 
From this view of history Acton derived his notion of the historian’s role.  
According to Acton the historian is to find and make known God’s course in the past.  
This is a scientific endeavor in that the historian must cast aside all bias in order to 
project himself beyond his present circumstances into the past.  Out of this activity the 
historian may come to see a glimmer of the future because “there is prophetic office in 
history, and our notions of the future are shaped according to our experience of the 
past.”43  The historian is also charged with guiding the world to liberty because history is 
                                                 
41 Lord Acton, “Selections from the Acton Legacy: Add. Mss. 5602, p. 17” in Selected Writings of Lord 
Acton Volume III: Essays in Religion, Politics, and Morality, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Liberty Fund, 1988), 634. 
 
42 Himmelfarb, 203-204. 
 
43 Lord Acton, “Expectation of the French Revolution (1861), in Selected Writings of Lord Acton Volume 
II: Essays in the Study and Writing of History, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 
1986), 39.  See also John Nurser, The Reign of Conscience: Individual, Church, and State in Lord Acton’s 
History of Liberty (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987), 168. 
 67
a teacher.44  By being critical of the past and looking to the future the historian can lead 
the way to the realization of liberty.  Acton combines the historicist’s scientific method 
with a system of judgment based on an absolutist universal principle, not Enlightenment 
reason, but a Christian ethic.45   
Acton strove to carve a place for himself amongst the competing historical 
conceptions of his day: positivism and historicism.  He rejected positivism outright, and 
attempted to salvage what he felt to be useful within historicism.  Above all, Acton’s 
main concern was to craft a methodology and conception of history that was in line with 
his theory of progress as an ever increasing liberty in which the individual is free to 
follow his conscience and in which societies, and likewise states, evolve in a manner 
ordained by God through natural law.  To do so Acton embraced the scientific 
methodology and objectivity of historicism while excoriating its nationalist tendencies 
and replacing its relativistic outlook with judgment according to an absolute moral 
standard.  Visible in Acton’s thought, particularly in his rejection of positivism and 
partial embrace of historicism, is the impact nineteenth-century historical consciousness 
had on the classical liberal conceptual framework.  Historical consciousness helped 
facilitate a move away from the classical liberal view of society as an accumulation of 
reasoned individuals, who operate in the midst of universal, static, natural laws.  In place 
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of this classical liberal conceptual framework, historical consciousness helped to 
introduce a newer framework in which society is organicized, or conceived of as an entity 
in and of itself, and in which individuals and societies are historicized, or are dynamic 
outgrowths of the past. 
While Acton was immersed in the historiographical developments of the 
nineteenth century, Spencer willfully stood apart from historical debate.  Spencer was 
dismissive of history and both dismissive and contemptuous of historians.  Spencer felt 
the historical discipline, especially in its contemporary fixation on military, political, and 
court history, to be conservative, outmoded, and intended to support the present social 
order and hierarchy.  Spencer believed that historians strove to maintain a static social 
order when, in fact, society and individuals were ever-changing and adapting to the 
Moral Law, or conditions of civilization.46  Spencer’s contempt for the historical 
discipline does not mean that he was not affected by the historiographical developments 
of his time period, namely positivism and historicism. 
In many respects, Spencer can be labeled a positivist.  Spencer used ethnographic 
and historical facts as the data behind his generalizations regarding social evolution.  As a 
uniformitarian, Spencer saw all of history proceeding in one direction with all of its parts 
resembling each other.  The same laws that governed nature, governed people, and also 
governed history.  As Spencer wrote in 1884, “there are no phenomena which a society 
presents but what have their origins in the phenomena of individual human life, which 
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again have their roots in vital phenomena at large.”47  Spencer divided the facts at hand 
into the essential, which pertained to gradual structural and evolutionary change, and the 
incidental, which pertained to the particulars of the individual and specific events.  
Similar to a positivist historian, Spencer then attempted to derive from his observation of 
essential facts a set of principles that would serve as an explanatory generalization of the 
world, including society, and as a guide for action.48  The following is characteristic of 
Spencer in this regard, “We will contemplate first the general conditions to individual 
life; and then the general conditions to social life.  We shall find that both yield the same 
verdict.”49  This emphasis on the general and deriving universal law from the observation 
of regular phenomena is very much a positivistic enterprise.  Furthermore, it allows a 
shift from a classical liberal conceptual framework of society as reasoned individuals to a 
new conceptual framework of an organicized society. 
Within Spencer’s positivistic enterprise there is also an element of historicism.  
The historian Ellen Frankel Paul argued in “Herbert Spencer: The Historicist as a Failed 
Prophet” that Spencer can be interpreted as an historicist who fell victim to what the 
historian Karl Popper identified as the “historicist fallacy.”  This fallacy is the idea that 
historicists are holistic, collectivistic, and deterministic and believers in the idea that 
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history can predict the future.  Thus a false assumption on the part of the historicist will 
yield a false prediction.  According to Paul, Spencer was an historicist, albeit an 
inconsistent one, who was a holist holding to individualism and a determinist in favor of 
human freedom.50  Spencer is a holist and determinist in regard to his conception of 
society as an organism and his teleological theory of progress, but he is also an 
individualist and proponent of human freedom in regard to the emphasis he placed on 
individual freedom of action. 
What Spencer believed to be the trend of history, or rather development, was 
mankind’s increasing conformity to the Moral Law, which stated that “every man has 
freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other 
man.”51  Spencer asserted that “the course of civilization could not possibly have been 
other than it has been.”52  The course that Spencer envisioned was an historical 
progression from a primitive society in which savage man conquered the earth in order to 
pave the way for the establishment of civilization, or the social state.  The first stage of 
civilization is the militant phase characterized by a regime of status and compulsory 
cooperation.  The second stage of civilization, the one Spencer believed nineteenth-
century Britain was in the midst of, is the industrial phase characterized by a regime of 
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contract and voluntary cooperation.53  In these stages government is simply an apparatus 
to help men observe the Moral Law.  The next and final stage is the development of a 
utopia in which all men are adapted to the Moral Law and government is no longer 
necessary.54  Though Spencer did not wish to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
historical discipline, he was willing to see within history an organic development 
progressing to a predictable future, the vision of which was made possible by the 
investigation and observation of history.  This historicist-like view with an eye towards 
organic growth over time again illustrates a shift towards a conception of an organicized 
society, a society that is an entity in its own right.  
Spencer’s reflection of positivism and historicism, two competing and mutually 
exclusive traditions within nineteenth-century historical consciousness, seems 
paradoxical.  Instead of posing a paradox, Spencer’s work points to the prevalence of 
historical consciousness in the nineteenth century.  Spencer strove to produce a purely 
scientific work devoid of any trace of the historical discipline he despised.  Yet Spencer 
managed to act the part of the positivist historian in his effort to produce generalizations 
from historical fact and to also act the part of the historicist in his willingness to see 
teleological organic development in mankind’s past. 
A new historical consciousness emerged in the nineteenth century centered on 
two competing conceptions of history: positivism and historicism.  Acton’s and Spencer’s 
interaction with and usage of these traditions illustrate how historical consciousness 
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undermined the classical liberal conceptual framework in which society was a sum of 
individuals, who possessed a static nature characterized by reason and operated amidst 
universal laws discernable through reason.  In place of this framework, historical 
consciousness lent itself to a new framework in which society was organicized, society 
became an entity in its own right, and in which individuals and societies were 
historicized, or were dynamic outgrowths of the past.  The works of Acton and Spencer 
illustrate how historical consciousness along with evolutionary thought and language 
facilitated a shift away from the classical liberal conceptual framework to a newer 
framework particular to late-nineteenth-century Britain.  Acton and Spencer utilized this 
newer framework, the product of nineteenth century intellectual developments, to 
formulate their views on the struggle over the widening circle of political power and 
participation in Britain. 
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IV. Acton, Spencer, and the Struggle over Political Power and Participation 
 
 Acton and Spencer witnessed the expansion of the franchise in Britain to include 
nearly all male citizens through the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 and both men were 
well aware of the franchise debate.  Acton and Spencer’s views on democracy and 
suffrage in Britain were shaped at their root by the intellectual context of the late 
nineteenth century, a context markedly different than that of the early nineteenth century, 
which underpinned classical liberalism.  These views stemmed from Acton’s and 
Spencer’s respective worldviews.  As previous chapters show, these were shaped by ideas 
of progress influenced by and sometimes expressed in evolutionary terms and an 
historical consciousness fueled by positivism and historicism. 
   Britain underwent significant change in the decades between the Reform Act of 
1832 and the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884.  Throughout the nineteenth century Britain 
continued to industrialize.  With industrialization came urbanization, the emergence of 
the middle and working classes, and the harsh ups and downs of a cyclical industrial 
economy.  Between 1820 and 1850 Britain, under the strain of rapid industrial and urban 
growth, faced severe unrest and was plagued by the ‘condition of England question’ – 
how should the state deal with the deplorable urban and working class living conditions 
and the resultant political turmoil?   
Government response to the ‘condition of England question’ was contradictory.  
On the one hand, free trade, laissez faire, and nonintervention appeared to triumph with 
the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.  On the other hand, government administration and 
relief became increasingly centralized through local reform in the 1830s and 1840s, 
including the Poor Law Amendment of 1834.  Contrary to the desires of advocates of 
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laissez faire, the government also began to regulate industry, such as in the case of 
factory and mine labor in the Factory Laws of 1842 and 1847.1   
The unrest and anxiety of the ‘condition of England question’ subsided by the 
1850s.  Over the latter half of the nineteenth century, a lower-middle class developed to 
manage the bureaucratic and financial service needs of Britain’s increasingly commercial 
economy.  By the 1870s, a national system of free public elementary education was in 
place and trade unionism flourished.  At this point, many wage-earners were better off 
than they had been in the past.  Increasingly, British attention turned outward as internal 
unrest was quieted and Britain began to feel increasing military, economic, and imperial 
competition from Europe, the United States, and Japan.  This period was marked by a 
new imperialism and the expansion of the British Empire in Africa, Asia, and the 
Pacific.2  Despite pressing international developments, the issue of democracy still drew 
attention in mid-to-late nineteenth-century Britain. 
 Acton viewed democracy, as he did much else that he encountered, through the 
lens of his teleological view of liberty.  Acton believed that the world was on a path of 
progress in which liberty – an individual possessing the freedom of action necessary to 
follow his conscious, to do what he believes is God’s will – was continually increasing.  
Societies, and the states constructed on them, should be evolving in line with the progress 
of liberty.  Therefore, to the extent that democracy was suited to and could further the 
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cause of liberty Acton supported it.  When Acton weighed democracy against his criteria, 
however, he found democracy to be wanting. 
 Acton believed that too much democracy was detrimental to liberty.  In fact, 
democracy, in Acton’s eyes, tended towards the tyrannical.  He wrote of democracy’s 
drawbacks in 1878, “The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, 
or rather of that party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in 
carrying elections.”3  Not only can democratic government be tyrannical, but Acton also 
believed it could be arbitrary: “Democracy is government of the strongest…They 
[democracy and military despotism] are the brutal forms of government and as strength 
and authority go together, necessarily arbitrary.”4   
Democracy was tyrannical and arbitrary – a threat to liberty – but, under the 
proper circumstances, Acton believed democracy could be salvaged.  According to Acton 
in “Political Causes of the American Revolution” (1861), democratic governments faced 
a choice between absolute power and respect for the law: 
The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the sovereignty of 
the people, depends on the choice it makes between these opposite principles, 
absolute power on the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and the 
authority of tradition.  It must stand or fall according to its choice, whether to give 
                                                 
3 Lord Acton, “Sir Erskine May’s Democracy in Europe (1878),” in Selected Writings of Lord Acton 
Volume I: Essays in the History of Liberty, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: LibertyClassics, 
1984), 83. 
 
4 Lord Acton, “Selections from the Acton Legacy: Add. Mss. 5528, p. 104” in Selected Writings of Lord 
Acton Volume III: Essays in Religion, Politics, and Morality, ed. J. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Liberty Fund, 1988), 556. 
 
 76
the supremacy to the law or to the will of the people; whether to constitute a 
moral association maintained by duty, or a physical one kept together by 
force…either absolute or organic, either governed by law, and therefore 
constitutional, or by a will which, being the source, cannot be the object of laws, 
and is therefore despotic.5 
 
Democratic government, as a manifestation of popular sovereignty, could either be 
absolutist, arbitrary, and despotic – yielding to the whims and brute force of the masses – 
or it could be a moral association deferring its judgment to the law, that body of custom 
and legislation that grows out of the wisdom of the past and evolves to accommodate 
society in the present.  The correct and hardest choice was to place law above the popular 
will.  The only way to ensure this result was to place democracy within a federal system 
of government.  As Acton noted, “of all the checks on democracy, federalism has been 
the most efficacious.”6     
 Acton did not disapprove of extending the franchise to the working class.  Unlike 
much of the aristocracy, Acton did not believe that the upper class was more suited to 
rule than the rest of society; it did not possess any superior political wisdom or virtue.  
Nor was he alarmed by imagined venality, ignorance, drunkenness, and violence amongst 
the working classes.7  Acton wrote to Mary Gladstone in 1881:  
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The fact is that education, intelligence, wealth, are a security against certain faults 
of conduct, not against errors of policy…The danger is not that a particular class 
is unfit to govern.  Every class is unfit to govern.  The law of liberty tends to 
abolish the reign of race over race, of faith over faith, of class over class.  It is not 
the realization of a political ideal: it is the discharge of a moral obligation.8   
 
There was nothing particular to the working class that should bar them from political 
participation in Acton’s eyes. 
      Instead of seeing in the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 the beginning of democratic 
tyranny and the end of parliamentary government, Acton welcomed both as instilling a 
measure of justice and liberty to society.  Acton felt that the government prior to these 
acts catered to the interests of one group, the elites and the middle class manufacturers, 
when government should act with impartiality.9  Acton noted: 
We are forced…to share the government with the working class by considerations 
which were made supreme by the awakening of political economy…If there is a 
free contract, in open market, between capital and labor, it cannot be right that 
one of the two contracting parties should have the making of the laws, the 
management of the conditions, the keeping of the peace, the administration of 
justice, the distribution of taxes, the control of expenditure, in its own hands 
exclusively.10   
 
It was only right and just that the working class be permitted access to political power 
and participation. 
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 Classical liberals in the early half of the nineteenth century had also favored the 
widening of the circle of political power and participation.  While Acton may appear to 
be a classical liberal in this vein, his views on democracy and his justification for the later 
Reform Acts are not derived from the same conceptual framework that supported 
classical liberals in the early nineteenth century.  Acton did not operate off of a 
conceptual framework in which society is composed of individuals who possess a 
constant nature characterized by reason and who interact with an environment that is 
governed by static, universal natural laws discernable to the reasoned individual.  This is 
illustrated by his usage of biological and evolutionary metaphor and his intuition of the 
implications of nineteenth-century historical consciousness.  In this later framework 
society is organicized; it is an organism and individuals are its component parts, its 
organs.  Both society and individuals are dynamic outgrowths of the past.  Thus Acton’s 
support for the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 and for democracy, conditioned on a 
federal system of government, was based on how he saw it fit with the progression of 
liberty through time and the evolution of society as supported by this later conceptual 
framework. 
 Spencer’s view of democracy, like Acton’s, was related to his worldview and 
theory of progress.  Spencer believed that mankind was evolving towards a state of 
perfect adaptation to the Moral Law, or the Law of Equal Freedom, which stated that 
each individual was free to act as long as he did not impede the rights of another.11  
Spencer maintained that when mankind reached this stage government would no longer 
                                                 
11 Social Statistics (1851), 43. 
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exist because, as Spencer asserted in Social Statistics, “morality cannot recognize it 
[government]; for morality, being simply a statement of the perfect law [the Moral Law], 
can give no countenance to anything growing out of, and living by, breaches of that law.  
Wherefore, legislative authority can never be ethical – must always be conventional 
merely.”12  Government is outside of the Moral Law, a product of man’s non-adaptation 
to the Moral Law, and can only serve as an artificial aid to assist mankind in developing 
the internal restraint necessary to act more in line with the Moral Law.13  The Moral Law 
merely tolerates government.  The most tolerable form of government is democracy 
because it “trespasses against the smallest number” and “all members of a community 
have like claims to political power.”14   
 In his youth, Spencer supported electoral reform in Britain.15  He defended 
extending the franchise to the working classes in both of his early works The Proper 
Sphere of Government (1848) and Social Statistics (1851).  In the Proper Sphere of 
Government, Spencer addressed one of the arguments against enfranchising the working 
class: society is complex and legislation is required to maintain the equilibrium of its 
interests – a task beyond the ability of the working class.  Spencer refuted this argument 
                                                 
12 Social Statistics (1851), 77. 
 
13 Social Statistics (1851), 81, 92. 
 
14 Social Statistics (1881), 78, 81. 
 
15 Wiltshire, 110. 
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by asserting that the problem with government was not an improperly legislated 
disequilibrium, but too much legislation interfering with the natural workings of society.  
Thus this objection to working class enfranchisement was unsubstantiated.16  In Social 
Statistics, Spencer countered several objections to working class enfranchisement, such 
as the idea that working-class enfranchisement would amount to a working-class tyranny 
based on its superior numbers and the idea that the working class was immoral, violent, 
and ignorant.  He asserted that the working class had too many divergent interests to 
allow for the unity necessary to amount to tyranny and that the working class was no 
more immoral, violent, and ignorant than the rest of society.17  Here the early Spencer 
was clearly in favor of electoral reform to extend political power and participation to the 
working class. 
Over the latter half of the nineteenth century Spencer backed away from his initial 
support of electoral reform.  As the working class demanded increasingly more 
interventionist legislation and Parliament occasionally acquiesced, Spencer began to 
question how in line democracy was with the Moral Law.  In “Parliamentary Reform: its 
dangers and safeguards (1860),” Spencer expressed reservations over interventionist 
measures in the Palmerston and Derby governments and working-class support for a 
Nine-Hour Bill.  To check this trend Spencer advocated spreading among the working 
class knowledge of the danger of government intervention and instituting a system of 
                                                 
16 Herbert Spencer, “The Proper Sphere of Government (1848),” in Herbert Spencer: Political Writings ed. 
John Offer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 52-54. 
 
17 Social Statistics (1851), 82-86. 
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direct taxation so the working class would be aware of and feel the burden of 
interventionist legislation.18   
Prior to the passage of the Reform Act of 1884, Spencer clearly no longer 
supported electoral reform.  In the Principles of Ethics, first appearing in 1879, Spencer 
asserted that universal suffrage would result in class-biased legislation contrary to the 
Moral Law.19  By the publication of his Essays: scientific, political and speculative 
(1891), Spencer viewed electoral rights as merely conferrable.  They were no longer a 
part of the inalienable rights described, in Social Statistics, as artificial divisions of the 
Moral Law nor a part of the general claim of the individual to exercise his faculties.20  
This was largely because of the “coming slavery,” the product of increasingly 
interventionist legislation corresponding to the enfranchisement of the working class.  
Spencer articulated the “coming slavery” in The Man versus the State (1884): 
…the changes made, the changes in progress, and the changes urged, will carry us 
not only towards State-ownership of land and dwellings and means of 
communications, all to be administered and worked by the State-agents, but 
towards State-usurpation of all industries: the private forms of which…will more 
and more die away; just as many voluntary schools have, in presence of Board-
schools.21 
 
                                                 
18 Wiltshire, 112-114. 
 
19 David Weinstein, Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer’s Liberal Utilitarianism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 125. 
 
20 Wiltshire, 113 and Social Statistics (1851), 59. 
 
21 The Man versus the State (1884), 100-101. 
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This growth of the state was contrary to the progression of mankind Spencer envisioned 
in which man becomes increasingly adapted to the Moral Law and government is no 
longer necessary. 
 Spencer’s initial support of electoral reform appears to reflect classical liberal 
efforts to expand the circle of political power and participation.  But, like Acton, 
Spencer’s views on democracy and electoral reform are based on his worldview and idea 
of progress.  Both of these stem from a conceptual framework, influenced by and 
evidenced by biological and evolutionary metaphor and a nineteenth century historical 
consciousness centered on positivism and historicism, which conceived of an organicized 
society and historicized individuals and societies.  This is a conceptual framework 
different from that underpinning the classical liberals of the early nineteenth century in 
which society is merely a sum of reasoned individuals with static natures operating in the 
midst of a social and natural environment governed by constant, universal laws 
discernable and usable through reason. 
These late-nineteenth century views on democracy and suffrage in Britain were 
not inspired by concerns regarding utility, universal law, reason, individuals, or a static 
conception of human nature, but were shaped around ideas of inevitable human and 
social development – in a collective rather than individual sense – and the fluidity of 
circumstances and human nature.  These diverging foundational ideas may sometimes 
yield conclusions similar to those of classical liberals, as is the case with Acton and 
Spencer, but they represent a shift in conceptual frameworks from the beginning to the 
end of the nineteenth century that is partially the result of the development of 
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evolutionary thought and language and historical consciousness in the form of positivism 
and historicism.   
This mid-to-late-nineteenth-century framework, in the right hands, can lend itself 
to new liberal interpretations.  Its visualization of an organicized society and historicized 
individuals and societies is in line with a new liberal conception of society as an organic 
whole with individuals as distinct parts working together.  From this idea of an 
organicized society new liberals justified an expanded role for the state and advocated 
positive rights and liberties, or the state providing for a minimum standard of living.  The 
classical liberal framework of the early nineteenth century could not support new 
liberalism and positive rights and liberties.  Instead, through its dual emphasis on society 
as a collection of reasoned individuals and individual agency, the classical liberal 
framework lent itself to justifications of limited state activity and negative rights and 
freedom, or noninterference with the individual.  This in turn supported the individual 
rights and individual liberty that was at the core of classical liberalism.     
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Conclusion 
 Acton and Spencer may superficially appear to be classical liberals, explaining the 
way in which some libertarians like to seize upon them as such, but Acton and Spencer 
are not classical liberals.  Acton and Spencer are rooted in their time period, the context 
of mid-to-late-nineteenth-century Britain, and operate within and exhibit a conceptual 
framework unlike that which underpinned classical liberals of the early nineteenth 
century.   
Classical liberalism, a philosophy concerned with individual liberty and 
individual rights, was supported by a conceptual framework in which society was 
conceived of as a collection of individuals.  These individuals possessed a constant nature 
characterized by reason, and they interacted with an environment that was governed by 
static, universal laws that were discernable and employable by the individual utilizing his 
faculty of reason.  The early liberal forbearers, such as John Locke, within this 
framework, advocated the expansion of the circle of political power and participation to 
include the landed aristocracy in Parliament in addition to the monarchy.  And it was the 
classical liberals, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who, also in this 
framework, strove to expand the circle of political power and participation to include the 
middle class in addition to the aristocracy and monarchy.   
Throughout the mid-to-late nineteenth century biological and evolutionary 
thought and language seeped into political thought and understanding.  As illustrated by 
the works of Acton and Spencer, these biological and evolutionary metaphors 
transformed the liberal theme of progress from an emphasis, grounded in a classical 
liberal conceptual framework, on man’s reason and ability to master his environment to 
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an inevitable development rooted in the natural world.  This move suggests a shift to a 
new conceptual framework of an organicized society in which the nature of society and 
individuals is no longer constant, but is continually subject to change. 
An historical consciousness also developed over the nineteenth century that was 
centered on two competing approaches to history: positivism and historicism.  Positivists, 
in an extension of Enlightenment thought, attempted to discern in the past sets of 
regularly observable phenomena from which they could derive generalizations and 
universal laws.  These could then be used to govern the present and predict the future.  In 
the hands of Spencer, positivism and its predilection towards the general at the expense 
of the specific, illustrated a tendency towards an organicized rather than individualized 
conception of society.  Historicists, reflecting Romantic thought, attempted to graft 
scientific methodology onto the practice of history while also emphasizing a sympathetic 
understanding of the past and reliving of the past through literary creation.  Historicists 
emphasized continuity with the past, organic growth, and the ability to trace and predict 
subsequent development through an understanding of origins.  Historicism, as seen 
through the work of Acton and Spencer, marked another shift towards an organicized, 
rather than individualized, conception of society and an historicized conception of the 
individual and society. 
Biological and evolutionary thought and language along with historical 
consciousness in the form of positivism and historicism represent two intellectual 
developments active in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.  These intellectual 
developments undermined the classical liberal conceptual framework of ahistorical, 
reasoned individuals operating within a similarly ahistorical, natural environment 
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governed by universal laws discernable and usable through the individual’s faculty of 
reason.  These intellectual developments of the mid-to-late nineteenth century suggest a 
shift towards a conceptual framework, rivaling that of the early nineteenth century, in 
which society is organized and societies, as well individuals, are dynamic products of 
past developments. 
It is this later conceptual framework that underpinned the work of Acton and 
Spencer, so that while they may seem to mirror classical liberals, such as in their 
advocacy of the enfranchisement of the working class through the Reform Acts of 1867 
and 1884, Acton and Spencer are not classical liberals.  This later framework, with its 
emphasis on group conceptualization and the flexibility of social conditions and human 
nature, does not limit itself to individual liberty and individual freedom in the classical 
liberal sense of negative rights and negative liberty.  Instead it lends itself to new liberal 
interpretations including positive rights and positive liberty. 
Despite what some libertarians would like to believe, and perhaps would like the 
world to believe, Acton and Spencer are not classical liberals nor are libertarians.  
Classical liberals are particular to the context of early-nineteenth-century Britain just as 
Acton and Spencer are particular to the context of mid-to-late nineteenth-century Britain 
and libertarians are particular to the present.  What is made visible in libertarian attempts 
to appropriate classical liberalism and to select historical figures as classical liberals is a 
struggle in contemporary political discourse over the nature of liberalism.  If libertarians 
can successfully claim their conception of liberalism as the true liberalism, then they can 
assume the position of legitimacy in debates over political and social policy.  
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